Data & Privacy
AI & Trust
Cybersecurity
Digital Services & Media
CHAPTER I
General provisionsArticles 1 — 4
CHAPTER II
ICT risk managementArticles 5 — 16
CHAPTER III
ICT-related incident management, classification and reportingArticles 17 — 23
CHAPTER IV
Digital operational resilience testingArticles 24 — 27
CHAPTER V
Managing of ICT third-party riskArticles 28 — 44
CHAPTER VI
Information-sharing arrangementsArticles 45 — 45
CHAPTER VII
Competent authoritiesArticles 46 — 56
CHAPTER VIII
Delegated actsArticles 57 — 57
CHAPTER IX
Transitional and final provisionsArticles 58 — 64
The propagators of cyber-attacks tend to pursue financial gains directly at the source, thus exposing financial entities to significant consequences. To prevent ICT systems from losing integrity or becoming unavailable, and hence to avoid data breaches and damage to physical ICT infrastructure, the reporting of major ICT-related incidents by financial entities should be significantly improved and streamlined. ICT-related incident reporting should be harmonised through the introduction of a requirement for all financial entities to report directly to their relevant competent authorities. Where a financial entity is subject to supervision by more than one national competent authority, Member States should designate a single competent authority as the addressee of such reporting. Credit institutions classified as significant in accordance with Article 6(4) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 should submit such reporting to the national competent authorities, which should subsequently transmit the report to the European Central Bank (ECB).
The direct reporting should enable financial supervisors to have immediate access to information about major ICT-related incidents. Financial supervisors should in turn pass on details of major ICT-related incidents to public non-financial authorities (such as competent authorities and single points of contact under Directive (EU) 2022/2555, national data protection authorities, and to law enforcement authorities for major ICT-related incidents of a criminal nature) in order to enhance such authorities awareness of such incidents and, in the case of CSIRTs, to facilitate prompt assistance that may be given to financial entities, as appropriate. Member States should, in addition, be able to determine that financial entities themselves should provide such information to public authorities outside the financial services area. Those information flows should allow financial entities to swiftly benefit from any relevant technical input, advice about remedies, and subsequent follow-up from such authorities. The information on major ICT-related incidents should be mutually channelled: financial supervisors should provide all necessary feedback or guidance to the financial entity, while the ESAs should share anonymised data on cyber threats and vulnerabilities relating to an incident, to aid wider collective defence.