Data & Privacy
- Data Act
- Data Governance Act
- ePrivacy Directive
- GDPR
AI & Trust
- Artificial Intelligence Act
Cybersecurity
- Cybersecurity Act
- DORA
- NIS2
Digital Services & Media
- Digital Markets Act
- Digital Services Act
- European Media Freedom Act
Digital Operational Resilience Act
- Recitals
CHAPTER I
General provisionsArticles 1 — 4
CHAPTER II
ICT risk managementArticles 5 — 16
CHAPTER III
ICT-related incident management, classification and reportingArticles 17 — 23
CHAPTER IV
Digital operational resilience testingArticles 24 — 27
CHAPTER V
Managing of ICT third-party riskArticles 28 — 44
CHAPTER VI
Information-sharing arrangementsArticles 45 — 45
CHAPTER VII
Competent authoritiesArticles 46 — 56
CHAPTER VIII
Delegated actsArticles 57 — 57
CHAPTER IX
Transitional and final provisionsArticles 58 — 64
DORA Article 35. Powers of the Lead Overseer
- 1.For the purposes of carrying out the duties laid down in this Section, the Lead Overseer shall have the following powers in respect of the critical ICT third-party service providers:
- (a)to request all relevant information and documentation in accordance with Article 37;
- (c)to request, after the completion of the oversight activities, reports specifying the actions that have been taken or the remedies that have been implemented by the critical ICT third-party service providers in relation to the recommendations referred to in point (d) of this paragraph;
- (d)to issue recommendations on the areas referred to in Article 33(3), in particular concerning the following:
(i)
the use of specific ICT security and quality requirements or processes, in particular in relation to the roll-out of patches, updates, encryption and other security measures which the Lead Overseer deems relevant for ensuring the ICT security of services provided to financial entities;(ii)
the use of conditions and terms, including their technical implementation, under which the critical ICT third-party service providers provide ICT services to financial entities, which the Lead Overseer deems relevant for preventing the generation of single points of failure, the amplification thereof, or for minimising the possible systemic impact across the Union’s financial sector in the event of ICT concentration risk;(iii)
any planned subcontracting, where the Lead Overseer deems that further subcontracting, including subcontracting arrangements which the critical ICT third-party service providers plan to enter into with ICT third-party service providers or with ICT subcontractors established in a third country, may trigger risks for the provision of services by the financial entity, or risks to the financial stability, based on the examination of the information gathered in accordance with Articles 37 and 38;(iv)
refraining from entering into a further subcontracting arrangement, where the following cumulative conditions are met:—the envisaged subcontractor is an ICT third-party service provider or an ICT subcontractor established in a third country;—the subcontracting concerns critical or important functions of the financial entity; and—the Lead Overseer deems that the use of such subcontracting poses a clear and serious risk to the financial stability of the Union or to financial entities, including to the ability of financial entities to comply with supervisory requirements.- For the purpose of point (iv) of this point, ICT third-party service providers shall, using the template referred to in Article 41(1), point (b), transmit the information regarding subcontracting to the Lead Overseer.
- 2.When exercising the powers referred to in this Article, the Lead Overseer shall:
- (a)ensure regular coordination within the JON, and in particular shall seek consistent approaches, as appropriate, with regard to the oversight of critical ICT third-party service providers;
- (b)take due account of the framework established by Directive (EU) 2022/2555 and, where necessary, consult the relevant competent authorities designated or established in accordance with that Directive, in order to avoid duplication of technical and organisational measures that might apply to critical ICT third-party service providers pursuant to that Directive;
- (c)seek to minimise, to the extent possible, the risk of disruption to services provided by critical ICT third-party service providers to customers that are entities falling outside the scope of this Regulation.
- 3.The Lead Overseer shall consult the Oversight Forum before exercising the powers referred to in paragraph 1. Before issuing recommendations in accordance with paragraph 1, point (d), the Lead Overseer shall give the opportunity to the ICT third-party service provider to provide, within 30 calendar days, relevant information evidencing the expected impact on customers that are entities falling outside the scope of this Regulation and, where appropriate, formulating solutions to mitigate risks.
- 4.The Lead Overseer shall inform the JON of the outcome of the exercise of the powers referred to in paragraph 1, points (a) and (b). The Lead Overseer shall, without undue delay, transmit the reports referred to in paragraph 1, point (c), to the JON and to the competent authorities of the financial entities using the ICT services of that critical ICT third-party service provider.
- 5.Critical ICT third-party service providers shall cooperate in good faith with the Lead Overseer, and assist it in the fulfilment of its tasks.
- 6.In the event of whole or partial non-compliance with the measures required to be taken pursuant to the exercise of the powers under paragraph 1, points (a), (b) and (c), and after the expiry of a period of at least 30 calendar days from the date on which the critical ICT third-party service provider received notification of the respective measures, the Lead Overseer shall adopt a decision imposing a periodic penalty payment to compel the critical ICT third-party service provider to comply with those measures.
- 7.The periodic penalty payment referred to in paragraph 6 shall be imposed on a daily basis until compliance is achieved and for no more than a period of six months following the notification of the decision to impose a periodic penalty payment to the critical ICT third-party service provider.
- 8.The amount of the periodic penalty payment, calculated from the date stipulated in the decision imposing the periodic penalty payment, shall be up to 1 % of the average daily worldwide turnover of the critical ICT third-party service provider in the preceding business year. When determining the amount of the penalty payment, the Lead Overseer shall take into account the following criteria regarding non-compliance with the measures referred to in paragraph 6:
- (a)the gravity and the duration of non-compliance;
- (b)whether non-compliance has been committed intentionally or negligently;
- (c)the level of cooperation of the ICT third-party service provider with the Lead Overseer.
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, in order to ensure a consistent approach, the Lead Overseer shall engage in consultation within the JON.
- 9.Penalty payments shall be of an administrative nature and shall be enforceable. Enforcement shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure in force in the Member State on the territory of which inspections and access shall be carried out. Courts of the Member State concerned shall have jurisdiction over complaints related to irregular conduct of enforcement. The amounts of the penalty payments shall be allocated to the general budget of the European Union.
- 10.The Lead Overseer shall disclose to the public every periodic penalty payment that has been imposed, unless such disclosure would seriously jeopardise the financial markets or cause disproportionate damage to the parties involved.
- 11.Before imposing a periodic penalty payment under paragraph 6, the Lead Overseer shall give the representatives of the critical ICT third-party service provider subject to the proceedings the opportunity to be heard on the findings and shall base its decisions only on findings on which the critical ICT third-party service provider subject to the proceedings has had an opportunity to comment. The rights of the defence of the persons subject to the proceedings shall be fully respected in the proceedings. The critical ICT third-party service provider subject to the proceedings shall be entitled to have access to the file, subject to the legitimate interest of other persons in the protection of their business secrets. The right of access to the file shall not extend to confidential information or to the Lead Overseer’s internal preparatory documents.
Relevant Recitals for this Article
Against this background, the need of the Lead Overseer to impose penalty payments to compel critical ICT third-party service providers to comply with the transparency and access-related obligations set out in this Regulation should not be jeopardised by difficulties raised by the enforcement of those penalty payments in relation to critical ICT third-party service providers established in third countries. In order to ensure the enforceability of such penalties, and to allow a swift roll out of procedures upholding the critical ICT third-party service providers’ rights of defence in the context of the designation mechanism and the issuance of recommendations, those critical ICT third-party service providers, providing services to financial entities that affect the supply of financial services, should be required to maintain an adequate business presence in the Union. Due to the nature of the oversight, and the absence of comparable arrangements in other jurisdictions, there are no suitable alternative mechanisms ensuring this objective by way of effective cooperation with financial supervisors in third countries in relation to the monitoring of the impact of digital operational risks posed by systemic ICT third-party service providers, qualifying as critical ICT third-party service providers established in third countries. Therefore, in order to continue its provision of ICT services to financial entities in the Union, an ICT third-party service provider established in a third country which has been designated as critical in accordance with this Regulation should undertake, within 12 months of such designation, all necessary arrangements to ensure its incorporation within the Union, by means of establishing a subsidiary, as defined throughout the Union , namely in Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council .
Lead Overseers should be granted the necessary powers to conduct investigations, to carry out onsite and offsite inspections at the premises and locations of critical ICT third-party service providers and to obtain complete and updated information. Those powers should enable the Lead Overseer to acquire real insight into the type, dimension and impact of the ICT third-party risk posed to financial entities and ultimately to the Union’s financial system. Entrusting the ESAs with the lead oversight role is a prerequisite for understanding and addressing the systemic dimension of ICT risk in finance. The impact of critical ICT third-party service providers on the Union financial sector and the potential issues caused by the ICT concentration risk entailed call for taking a collective approach at Union level. The simultaneous carrying out of multiple audits and access rights, performed separately by numerous competent authorities, with little or no coordination among them, would prevent financial supervisors from obtaining a complete and comprehensive overview of ICT third-party risk in the Union, while also creating redundancy, burden and complexity for critical ICT third-party service providers if they were subject to numerous monitoring and inspection requests.
The exercise of the oversight should be guided by three operational principles seeking to ensure: (a) close coordination among the ESAs in their Lead Overseer roles, through a joint oversight network (JON), (b) consistency with the framework established by Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (through a voluntary consultation of bodies under that Directive to avoid duplication of measures directed at critical ICT third-party service providers), and (c) applying diligence to minimise the potential risk of disruption to services provided by the critical ICT third-party service providers to customers that are entities falling outside the scope of this Regulation.