EMFA Article 4. Rights of media service providers

The protection of editorial independence is a precondition for exercising the activity of media service providers and their professional integrity in a safe media environment. Editorial independence is especially important for media service providers which provide news and current affairs content, given its societal role as a public good. Media service providers should be able to exercise their economic activities freely in the internal market and compete on an equal footing in an increasingly online environment where information flows across borders.

Member States have taken different approaches to the protection of editorial freedom and editorial independence, which is increasingly being challenged across the Union. In particular, there is a growing interference with the editorial decisions of media service providers in several Member States. Such interference can be direct or indirect, from the state or other actors, including public authorities, elected officials, government officials and politicians, for example to obtain a political advantage. Shareholders and other private parties who have a stake in media service providers might act in ways which go beyond the necessary balance between their own business freedom and the freedom of expression, on the one hand, and editorial freedom of expression and the information rights of users, on the other hand, in pursuit of an economic or other advantage. Given the societal role of the media, such undue interference could negatively affect the public opinion-forming process. Moreover, recent trends in media distribution and consumption, including, in particular, in the online environment, have prompted Member States to consider laws which aim to regulate the provision of media content. Approaches taken by media service providers to guarantee editorial independence also vary. As a result of such interference and fragmentation of regulation and approaches, the conditions for the exercise of economic activities by media service providers and, ultimately, the quality of media services received by citizens and businesses are negatively affected in the internal market. It is thus necessary to put in place effective safeguards enabling the exercise of editorial freedom across the Union so that media service providers can independently produce and distribute their content across borders and recipients of media services can receive such content.

Journalists and editors are the main actors in the production and provision of trustworthy media content, in particular by reporting on news or current affairs. Sources are tantamount to ‘raw material’ for journalists: they are the basis for the production of media content, in particular news and current affairs content. It is therefore crucial that journalists’ ability to collect, fact-check and analyse information be protected, in particular information imparted or communicated confidentially, both offline and online, which relates to or is capable of identifying journalistic sources. Media service providers and their editorial staff, in particular journalists, including those operating in non-standard forms of employment, such as freelancers, should be able to rely on a robust protection of journalistic sources and confidential communications, including protection against undue interference and the deployment of surveillance technologies. Without such protection, the free flow of sources to media service providers could be deterred and, thus, the free exercise of the economic activity by media service providers could be hindered to the detriment of the provision of information to the public, including on matters of public interest. As a result, journalists’ freedom to exercise their economic activity and fulfil their vital ‘public watchdog’ role could be jeopardised by such obstacles, thus affecting access to quality media services negatively.

In order to avoid circumvention of the protection of journalistic sources and confidential communications and guarantee adequate respect for one’s private and family life, home and communications in accordance with the Charter, safeguards should also apply to persons who, because of their regular private or professional relationship with media service providers or members of their editorial staff, are likely to have information that could identify journalistic sources or confidential communications. That should include persons living in a close relationship in a joint household and on a stable and continuous basis and persons who are or have been professionally involved in the preparation, production or dissemination of programmes or press publications and who are only targeted due to their close links with media service providers, journalists or other members of the editorial staff. The protection of journalistic sources and confidential communications should also benefit the staff of media service providers, such as the technical staff, including cybersecurity experts, who could be targeted given the important support role they provide to journalists in their daily work, which requires solutions to ensure the confidentiality of journalists’ work, and the resulting likelihood that they have access to information concerning journalistic sources or confidential communications.

Protecting journalistic sources and confidential communications is consistent with and contributes to the protection of the fundamental right enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter. It is also crucial for safeguarding the ‘public watchdog’ role of media service providers and, in particular investigative journalists in democratic societies and for upholding the rule of law. In light thereof, ensuring an adequate level of protection for journalistic sources and confidential communications requires that measures for obtaining such information be authorised by an authority that can independently and impartially assess whether it is justified by an overriding reason of public interest, such as a court, a judge, a prosecutor acting in a judicial capacity, or another such authority with competence to authorise those measures in accordance with national law. It also requires that surveillance measures be subject to regular review by such an authority to ascertain whether the conditions justifying the use of the measure in question continue to be fulfilled. That requirement is also met where the purpose of the regular review is to verify whether the conditions justifying an extension of the authorisation for the use of the measure have been fulfilled.

It should also be recalled that, in line with the established case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the right to effective judicial protection presupposes, in principle, being informed in due time, without jeopardising the effectiveness of ongoing investigations, of the surveillance measures taken without the knowledge of the person concerned in order to effectively exercise that right. In order to further strengthen that right, it is important that media service providers, journalists and persons who have a regular or professional relationship with them are able to rely on an adequate assistance when they exercise that right. Such assistance could be of legal, financial or other nature, for example providing information on available judicial remedies. Such assistance could be effectively provided, for example, by an independent authority or body or, where no such authority or body exists, a self-regulatory body or mechanism. It is not the purpose of this Regulation to harmonise the concepts of ‘detain’, ‘inspect’, ‘search and seizure’ or ‘surveillance’.

The protection of journalistic sources and confidential communications is currently regulated heterogeneously in the Member States. Some Member States provide an absolute protection against coercing journalists to disclose in criminal and administrative proceedings information that identifies their source, including communications that are held under a commitment of confidentiality. Other Member States provide a qualified protection confined to judicial proceedings based on certain criminal charges, while others provide protection in the form of a general principle. That leads to fragmentation in the internal market for media services and uneven standards of protection for journalistic sources and confidential communications across the Union. To that end, this Regulation introduces common minimum standards of protection for journalistic sources and confidential communications with regard to coercive measures used by Member States to obtain such information. For the purpose of ensuring the effective protection of journalistic sources and confidential communications, Member States should not take such measures, including the deployment of intrusive surveillance software, in relation to media service providers, their editorial staff or any persons who, because of their regular or professional relationship with a media service provider or its editorial staff, might have information related to or capable of identifying journalistic sources or confidential communications.

Media professionals, in particular journalists and other media professionals involved in editorial activities, work increasingly on cross-border projects and provide their services to cross-border audiences and, by extension, to media service providers. As a result, media service providers are likely to face barriers, legal uncertainty and uneven conditions of competition. Therefore, the protection of journalistic sources and confidential communications requires harmonisation and further strengthening at Union level. That should be without prejudice to further or absolute protection at national level.

Intrusive surveillance software, including, in particular, what is commonly referred to as ‘spyware’, represents a particularly invasive form of surveillance over media professionals and their sources. It can be deployed to secretly record calls or otherwise use the microphone of an end-user device, film or photograph natural persons, machines or their surroundings, copy messages, access encrypted content data, track browsing activity, track geolocation or collect other sensor data, or track activities across multiple end-user devices. It has dissuasive effects on the free exercise of economic activities in the media sector. It jeopardises, in particular, the trusted relationship of journalists with their sources, which is the core of the journalistic profession. Given the digital and intrusive nature of such software and the use of devices across borders, it has a particularly detrimental impact on the exercise of economic activities by media service providers in the internal market. It is therefore necessary to ensure that media service providers, including journalists, operating in the internal market for media services can rely on robust harmonised protection in relation to the deployment of intrusive surveillance software in the Union, including where Member State authorities resort to private parties to deploy it.

Intrusive surveillance software should only be deployed where it is justified by an overriding reason of public interest, it is provided for in Union or national law, it is in compliance with Article 52(1) of the Charter as interpreted by the Court of Justice and with other Union law, it has been authorised or, in exceptional and urgent cases, subsequently confirmed by a judicial authority or an independent and impartial decision-making authority, it occurs in investigations of offences listed in Article 2(2) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA punishable in the Member State concerned by a custodial sentence or a detention order of a maximum period of at least three years or in investigations of other serious offences punishable in the Member State concerned by a custodial sentence or a detention order of a maximum period of at least five years, as determined by the national law of that Member State, and provided that no other less restrictive measure would be adequate and sufficient to obtain the information sought. According to the principle of proportionality, limitations can be made to an individual’s rights and freedoms only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union. Thus, as regards specifically the deployment of intrusive surveillance software, it is necessary to ascertain whether the offence in question attains a threshold of seriousness as laid down in this Regulation, whether, following an individual assessment of all the relevant circumstances in a given case, the investigation and prosecution of that offence merit the particularly intrusive interference with fundamental rights and economic freedoms consisting in the deployment of intrusive surveillance software, whether there is sufficient evidence that the offence in question has been committed, and whether the deployment of intrusive surveillance software is relevant for the purpose of establishing the facts related to the investigation and prosecution of that offence.