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NIS2
  • Data & Privacy

    • Data Act
    • Data Governance Act
    • ePrivacy Directive
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    • Artificial Intelligence Act
  • Cybersecurity

    • Cybersecurity Act
    • DORA
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    • Digital Markets Act
    • Digital Services Act
    • European Media Freedom Act
NIS2

Recitals

NIS2
  • Data & Privacy

    • Data Act
    • Data Governance Act
    • ePrivacy Directive
    • GDPR
  • AI & Trust

    • Artificial Intelligence Act
  • Cybersecurity

    • Cybersecurity Act
    • DORA
    • NIS2
  • Digital Services & Media

    • Digital Markets Act
    • Digital Services Act
    • European Media Freedom Act
  • 1

    Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and the Council aimed to build cybersecurity capabilities across the Union, mitigate threats to network and information systems used to provide essential services in key sectors and ensure the continuity of such services when facing incidents, thus contributing to the Union’s security and to the effective functioning of its economy and society.

  • 2

    Since the entry into force of Directive (EU) 2016/1148, significant progress has been made in increasing the Union’s level of cyber resilience. The review of that Directive has shown that it has served as a catalyst for the institutional and regulatory approach to cybersecurity in the Union, paving the way for a significant change in mind-set. That Directive has ensured the completion of national frameworks on the security of network and information systems by establishing national strategies on security of network and information systems and establishing national capabilities and by implementing regulatory measures covering essential infrastructures and entities identified by each Member State. Directive (EU) 2016/1148 has also contributed to cooperation at Union level through the establishment of the Cooperation Group and the network of national computer security incident response teams. Notwithstanding those achievements, the review of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 has revealed inherent shortcomings that prevent it from addressing effectively current and emerging cybersecurity challenges.

  • 3

    Network and information systems have developed into a central feature of everyday life with the speedy digital transformation and interconnectedness of society, including in cross-border exchanges. That development has led to an expansion of the cyber threat landscape, bringing about new challenges, which require adapted, coordinated and innovative responses in all Member States. The number, magnitude, sophistication, frequency and impact of incidents are increasing, and present a major threat to the functioning of network and information systems. As a result, incidents can impede the pursuit of economic activities in the internal market, generate financial loss, undermine user confidence and cause major damage to the Union’s economy and society. Cybersecurity preparedness and effectiveness are therefore now more essential than ever to the proper functioning of the internal market. Moreover, cybersecurity is a key enabler for many critical sectors to successfully embrace the digital transformation and to fully grasp the economic, social and sustainable benefits of digitalisation.

  • 4

    The legal basis of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 was Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the objective of which is the establishment and functioning of the internal market by enhancing measures for the approximation of national rules. The cybersecurity requirements imposed on entities providing services or carrying out activities which are economically significant vary considerably among Member States in terms of type of requirement, their level of detail and the method of supervision. Those disparities entail additional costs and create difficulties for entities that offer goods or services across borders. Requirements imposed by one Member State that are different from, or even in conflict with, those imposed by another Member State, may substantially affect such cross-border activities. Furthermore, the possibility of the inadequate design or implementation of cybersecurity requirements in one Member State is likely to have repercussions at the level of cybersecurity of other Member States, in particular given the intensity of cross-border exchanges. The review of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 has shown a wide divergence in its implementation by Member States, including in relation to its scope, the delimitation of which was very largely left to the discretion of the Member States. Directive (EU) 2016/1148 also provided the Member States with very wide discretion as regards the implementation of the security and incident reporting obligations laid down therein. Those obligations were therefore implemented in significantly different ways at national level. There are similar divergences in the implementation of the provisions of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 on supervision and enforcement.

  • 5

    All those divergences entail a fragmentation of the internal market and can have a prejudicial effect on its functioning, affecting in particular the cross-border provision of services and the level of cyber resilience due to the application of a variety of measures. Ultimately, those divergences could lead to the higher vulnerability of some Member States to cyber threats, with potential spill-over effects across the Union. This Directive aims to remove such wide divergences among Member States, in particular by setting out minimum rules regarding the functioning of a coordinated regulatory framework, by laying down mechanisms for effective cooperation among the responsible authorities in each Member State, by updating the list of sectors and activities subject to cybersecurity obligations and by providing effective remedies and enforcement measures which are key to the effective enforcement of those obligations. Therefore, Directive (EU) 2016/1148 should be repealed and replaced by this Directive.

  • 6

    With the repeal of Directive (EU) 2016/1148, the scope of application by sectors should be extended to a larger part of the economy to provide a comprehensive coverage of sectors and services of vital importance to key societal and economic activities in the internal market. In particular, this Directive aims to overcome the shortcomings of the differentiation between operators of essential services and digital service providers, which has been proven to be obsolete, since it does not reflect the importance of the sectors or services for the societal and economic activities in the internal market.

    Relevant articles:1
  • 7

    Under Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Member States were responsible for identifying the entities which met the criteria to qualify as operators of essential services. In order to eliminate the wide divergences among Member States in that regard and ensure legal certainty as regards the cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations for all relevant entities, a uniform criterion should be established that determines the entities falling within the scope of this Directive. That criterion should consist of the application of a size-cap rule, whereby all entities which qualify as medium-sized enterprises under Article 2 of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC , or exceed the ceilings for medium-sized enterprises provided for in paragraph 1 of that Article, and which operate within the sectors and provide the types of service or carry out the activities covered by this Directive fall within its scope. Member States should also provide for certain small enterprises and microenterprises, as defined in Article 2(2) and (3) of that Annex, which fulfil specific criteria that indicate a key role for society, the economy or for particular sectors or types of service to fall within the scope of this Directive.

    Relevant articles:2
  • 8

    The exclusion of public administration entities from the scope of this Directive should apply to entities whose activities are predominantly carried out in the areas of national security, public security, defence or law enforcement, including the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences. However, public administration entities whose activities are only marginally related to those areas should not be excluded from the scope of this Directive. For the purposes of this Directive, entities with regulatory competences are not considered to be carrying out activities in the area of law enforcement and are therefore not excluded on that ground from the scope of this Directive. Public administration entities that are jointly established with a third country in accordance with an international agreement are excluded from the scope of this Directive. This Directive does not apply to Member States’ diplomatic and consular missions in third countries or to their network and information systems, insofar as such systems are located in the premises of the mission or are operated for users in a third country.

    Relevant articles:2
  • 9

    Member States should be able to take the necessary measures to ensure the protection of the essential interests of national security, to safeguard public policy and public security, and to allow for the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences. To that end, Member States should be able to exempt specific entities which carry out activities in the areas of national security, public security, defence or law enforcement, including the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, from certain obligations laid down in this Directive with regard to those activities. Where an entity provides services exclusively to a public administration entity that is excluded from the scope of this Directive, Member States should be able to exempt that entity from certain obligations laid down in this Directive with regard to those services. Furthermore, no Member State should be required to supply information the disclosure of which would be contrary to the essential interests of its national security, public security or defence. Union or national rules for the protection of classified information, non-disclosure agreements, and informal non-disclosure agreements such as the traffic light protocol should be taken into account in that context. The traffic light protocol is to be understood as a means to provide information about any limitations with regard to the further spreading of information. It is used in almost all computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) and in some information analysis and sharing centres.

    Relevant articles:2
  • 10

    Although this Directive applies to entities carrying out activities in the production of electricity from nuclear power plants, some of those activities may be linked to national security. Where that is the case, a Member State should be able to exercise its responsibility for safeguarding national security with respect to those activities, including activities within the nuclear value chain, in accordance with the Treaties.

    Relevant articles:2
  • 11

    Some entities carry out activities in the areas of national security, public security, defence or law enforcement, including the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, while also providing trust services. Trust service providers which fall within the scope of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council should fall within the scope of this Directive in order to secure the same level of security requirements and supervision as that which was previously laid down in that Regulation in respect of trust service providers. In line with the exclusion of certain specific services from Regulation (EU) No 910/2014, this Directive should not apply to the provision of trust services that are used exclusively within closed systems resulting from national law or from agreements between a defined set of participants.

    Relevant articles:2
  • 12

    Postal service providers as defined in Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council , including providers of courier services, should be subject to this Directive if they provide at least one of the steps in the postal delivery chain, in particular clearance, sorting, transport or distribution of postal items, including pick-up services, while taking account of the degree of their dependence on network and information systems. Transport services that are not undertaken in conjunction with one of those steps should be excluded from the scope of postal services.

  • 13

    Given the intensification and increased sophistication of cyber threats, Member States should strive to ensure that entities that are excluded from the scope of this Directive achieve a high level of cybersecurity and to support the implementation of equivalent cybersecurity risk-management measures that reflect the sensitive nature of those entities.

    Relevant articles:7
  • 14

    Union data protection law and Union privacy law applies to any processing of personal data under this Directive. In particular, this Directive is without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council . This Directive should therefore not affect, inter alia, the tasks and powers of the authorities competent to monitor compliance with the applicable Union data protection law and Union privacy law.

    Relevant articles:2
  • 15

    Entities falling within the scope of this Directive for the purpose of compliance with cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations should be classified into two categories, essential entities and important entities, reflecting the extent to which they are critical as regards their sector or the type of service they provide, as well as their size. In that regard, due account should be taken of any relevant sectoral risk assessments or guidance by the competent authorities, where applicable. The supervisory and enforcement regimes for those two categories of entities should be differentiated to ensure a fair balance between risk-based requirements and obligations on the one hand, and the administrative burden stemming from the supervision of compliance on the other.

    Relevant articles:3
  • 16

    In order to avoid entities that have partner enterprises or that are linked enterprises being considered to be essential or important entities where this would be disproportionate, Member States are able to take into account the degree of independence an entity enjoys in relation to its partner or linked enterprises when applying Article 6(2) of the Annex to Recommendation 2003/361/EC. In particular, Member States are able to take into account the fact that an entity is independent from its partner or linked enterprises in terms of the network and information systems that that entity uses in the provision of its services and in terms of the services that the entity provides. On that basis, where appropriate, Member States are able to consider that such an entity does not qualify as a medium-sized enterprise under Article 2 of the Annex to Recommendation 2003/361/EC, or does not exceed the ceilings for a medium-sized enterprise provided for in paragraph 1 of that Article, if, after taking into account the degree of independence of that entity, that entity would not have been considered to qualify as a medium-sized enterprise or to exceed those ceilings in the event that only its own data had been taken into account. This leaves unaffected the obligations laid down in this Directive of partner and linked enterprises which fall within the scope of this Directive.

    Relevant articles:3
  • 17

    Member States should be able to decide that entities identified before the entry into force of this Directive as operators of essential services in accordance with Directive (EU) 2016/1148 are to be considered to be essential entities.

    Relevant articles:3
  • 18

    In order to ensure a clear overview of the entities falling within the scope of this Directive, Member States should establish a list of essential and important entities as well as entities providing domain name registration services. For that purpose, Member States should require entities to submit at least the following information to the competent authorities, namely, the name, address and up-to-date contact details, including the email addresses, IP ranges and telephone numbers of the entity, and, where applicable, the relevant sector and subsector referred to in the annexes, as well as, where applicable, a list of the Member States where they provide services falling within the scope of this Directive. To that end, the Commission, with the assistance of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), should, without undue delay, provide guidelines and templates regarding the obligation to submit information. To facilitate the establishing and updating of the list of essential and important entities as well as entities providing domain name registration services, Member States should be able to establish national mechanisms for entities to register themselves. Where registers exist at national level, Member States can decide on the appropriate mechanisms that allow for the identification of entities falling within the scope of this Directive.

    Relevant articles:3
  • 19

    Member States should be responsible for submitting to the Commission at least the number of essential and important entities for each sector and subsector referred to in the annexes, as well as relevant information about the number of identified entities and the provision, from among those laid down in this Directive, on the basis of which they were identified, and the type of service that they provide. Member States are encouraged to exchange with the Commission information about essential and important entities and, in the case of a large-scale cybersecurity incident, relevant information such as the name of the entity concerned.

    Relevant articles:3
  • 20

    The Commission should, in cooperation with the Cooperation Group and after consulting the relevant stakeholders, provide guidelines on the implementation of the criteria applicable to microenterprises and small enterprises for the assessment of whether they fall within the scope of this Directive. The Commission should also ensure that appropriate guidance is given to microenterprises and small enterprises falling within the scope of this Directive. The Commission should, with the assistance of the Member States, make information available to microenterprises and small enterprises in that regard.

  • 21

    The Commission could provide guidance to assist Member States in implementing the provisions of this Directive on scope and evaluating the proportionality of the measures to be taken pursuant to this Directive, in particular as regards entities with complex business models or operating environments, whereby an entity may simultaneously fulfil the criteria assigned to both essential and important entities or may simultaneously carry out activities, some of which fall within and some of which are excluded from the scope of this Directive.

    Relevant articles:14
  • 22

    This Directive sets out the baseline for cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations across the sectors that fall within its scope. In order to avoid the fragmentation of cybersecurity provisions of Union legal acts, where further sector-specific Union legal acts pertaining to cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations are considered to be necessary to ensure a high level of cybersecurity across the Union, the Commission should assess whether such further provisions could be stipulated in an implementing act under this Directive. Should such an implementing act not be suitable for that purpose, sector-specific Union legal acts could contribute to ensuring a high level of cybersecurity across the Union, while taking full account of the specificities and complexities of the sectors concerned. To that end, this Directive does not preclude the adoption of further sector-specific Union legal acts addressing cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations that take due account of the need for a comprehensive and consistent cybersecurity framework. This Directive is without prejudice to the existing implementing powers that have been conferred on the Commission in a number of sectors, including transport and energy.

    Relevant articles:4
  • 23

    Where a sector-specific Union legal act contains provisions requiring essential or important entities to adopt cybersecurity risk-management measures or to notify significant incidents, and where those requirements are at least equivalent in effect to the obligations laid down in this Directive, those provisions, including on supervision and enforcement, should apply to such entities. If a sector-specific Union legal act does not cover all entities in a specific sector falling within the scope of this Directive, the relevant provisions of this Directive should continue to apply to the entities not covered by that act.

    Relevant articles:4
  • 24

    Where provisions of a sector-specific Union legal act require essential or important entities to comply with reporting obligations that are at least equivalent in effect to the reporting obligations laid down in this Directive, the consistency and effectiveness of the handling of incident notifications should be ensured. To that end, the provisions relating to incident notifications of the sector-specific Union legal act should provide the CSIRTs, the competent authorities or the single points of contact on cybersecurity (single points of contact) under this Directive with an immediate access to the incident notifications submitted in accordance with the sector-specific Union legal act. In particular, such immediate access can be ensured if incident notifications are being forwarded without undue delay to the CSIRT, the competent authority or the single point of contact under this Directive. Where appropriate, Member States should put in place an automatic and direct reporting mechanism that ensures systematic and immediate sharing of information with the CSIRTs, the competent authorities or the single points of contact concerning the handling of such incident notifications. For the purpose of simplifying reporting and of implementing the automatic and direct reporting mechanism, Member States could, in accordance with the sector-specific Union legal act, use a single entry point.

    Relevant articles:4
  • 25

    Sector-specific Union legal acts which provide for cybersecurity risk-management measures or reporting obligations that are at least equivalent in effect to those laid down in this Directive could provide that the competent authorities under such acts exercise their supervisory and enforcement powers in relation to such measures or obligations with the assistance of the competent authorities under this Directive. The competent authorities concerned could establish cooperation arrangements for that purpose. Such cooperation arrangements could specify, inter alia, the procedures concerning the coordination of supervisory activities, including the procedures of investigations and on-site inspections in accordance with national law, and a mechanism for the exchange of relevant information on supervision and enforcement between the competent authorities, including access to cyber-related information requested by the competent authorities under this Directive.

    Relevant articles:4
  • 26

    Where sector-specific Union legal acts require or provide incentives to entities to notify significant cyber threats, Member States should also encourage the sharing of significant cyber threats with the CSIRTs, the competent authorities or the single points of contact under this Directive, in order to ensure an enhanced level of those bodies’ awareness of the cyber threat landscape and to enable them to respond effectively and in a timely manner should the significant cyber threats materialise.

    Relevant articles:4
  • 27

    Future sector-specific Union legal acts should take due account of the definitions and the supervisory and enforcement framework laid down in this Directive.

    Relevant articles:4
  • 28

    Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council should be considered to be a sector-specific Union legal act in relation to this Directive with regard to financial entities. The provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 relating to information and communication technology (ICT) risk management, management of ICT-related incidents and, in particular, major ICT-related incident reporting, as well as on digital operational resilience testing, information-sharing arrangements and ICT third-party risk should apply instead of those provided for in this Directive. Member States should therefore not apply the provisions of this Directive on cybersecurity risk-management and reporting obligations, and supervision and enforcement, to financial entities covered by Regulation (EU) 2022/2554. At the same time, it is important to maintain a strong relationship and the exchange of information with the financial sector under this Directive. To that end, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 allows the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the competent authorities under that Regulation to participate in the activities of the Cooperation Group and to exchange information and cooperate with the single points of contact, as well as with the CSIRTs and the competent authorities under this Directive. The competent authorities under Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 should also transmit details of major ICT-related incidents and, where relevant, significant cyber threats to the CSIRTs, the competent authorities or the single points of contact under this Directive. This is achievable by providing immediate access to incident notifications and forwarding them either directly or through a single entry point. Moreover, Member States should continue to include the financial sector in their cybersecurity strategies and CSIRTs can cover the financial sector in their activities.

  • 29

    In order to avoid gaps between or duplications of cybersecurity obligations imposed on entities in the aviation sector, national authorities under Regulations (EC) No 300/2008 and (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council and the competent authorities under this Directive should cooperate in relation to the implementation of cybersecurity risk-management measures and the supervision of compliance with those measures at national level. The compliance of an entity with the security requirements laid down in Regulations (EC) No 300/2008 and (EU) 2018/1139 and in the relevant delegated and implementing acts adopted pursuant to those Regulations could be considered by the competent authorities under this Directive to constitute compliance with the corresponding requirements laid down in this Directive.

    Relevant articles:13
  • 30

    In view of the interlinkages between cybersecurity and the physical security of entities, a coherent approach should be ensured between Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council and this Directive. To achieve this, entities identified as critical entities under Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should be considered to be essential entities under this Directive. Moreover, each Member State should ensure that its national cybersecurity strategy provides for a policy framework for enhanced coordination within that Member State between its competent authorities under this Directive and those under Directive (EU) 2022/2557 in the context of information sharing about risks, cyber threats, and incidents as well as on non-cyber risks, threats and incidents, and the exercise of supervisory tasks. The competent authorities under this Directive and those under Directive (EU) 2022/2557 should cooperate and exchange information without undue delay, in particular in relation to the identification of critical entities, risks, cyber threats, and incidents as well as in relation to non-cyber risks, threats and incidents affecting critical entities, including the cybersecurity and physical measures taken by critical entities as well as the results of supervisory activities carried out with regard to such entities.

    Relevant articles:13
  • 31

    Entities belonging to the digital infrastructure sector are in essence based on network and information systems and therefore the obligations imposed on those entities pursuant to this Directive should address in a comprehensive manner the physical security of such systems as part of their cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations. Since those matters are covered by this Directive, the obligations laid down in Chapters III, IV and VI of Directive (EU) 2022/2557 do not apply to such entities.

  • 32

    Upholding and preserving a reliable, resilient and secure domain name system (DNS) are key factors in maintaining the integrity of the internet and are essential for its continuous and stable operation, on which the digital economy and society depend. Therefore, this Directive should apply to top-level-domain (TLD) name registries, and DNS service providers that are to be understood as entities providing publicly available recursive domain name resolution services for internet end-users or authoritative domain name resolution services for third-party usage. This Directive should not apply to root name servers.

    Relevant articles:236
  • 33

    Cloud computing services should cover digital services that enable on-demand administration and broad remote access to a scalable and elastic pool of shareable computing resources, including where such resources are distributed across several locations. Computing resources include resources such as networks, servers or other infrastructure, operating systems, software, storage, applications and services. The service models of cloud computing include, inter alia, Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), Software as a Service (SaaS) and Network as a Service (NaaS). The deployment models of cloud computing should include private, community, public and hybrid cloud. The cloud computing service and deployment models have the same meaning as the terms of service and deployment models defined under ISO/IEC 17788:2014 standard. The capability of the cloud computing user to unilaterally self-provision computing capabilities, such as server time or network storage, without any human interaction by the cloud computing service provider could be described as on-demand administration.

    Relevant articles:6
  • 34

    Given the emergence of innovative technologies and new business models, new cloud computing service and deployment models are expected to appear in the internal market in response to evolving customer needs. In that context, cloud computing services may be delivered in a highly distributed form, even closer to where data are being generated or collected, thus moving from the traditional model to a highly distributed one (edge computing).

    Relevant articles:6
  • 35

    Services offered by data centre service providers may not always be provided in the form of a cloud computing service. Accordingly, data centres may not always constitute a part of cloud computing infrastructure. In order to manage all the risks posed to the security of network and information systems, this Directive should therefore cover providers of data centre services that are not cloud computing services. For the purposes of this Directive, the term ‘data centre service’ should cover provision of a service that encompasses structures, or groups of structures, dedicated to the centralised accommodation, interconnection and operation of information technology (IT) and network equipment providing data storage, processing and transport services together with all the facilities and infrastructures for power distribution and environmental control. The term ‘data centre service’ should not apply to in-house corporate data centres owned and operated by the entity concerned, for its own purposes.

    Relevant articles:6
  • 36

    Research activities play a key role in the development of new products and processes. Many of those activities are carried out by entities that share, disseminate or exploit the results of their research for commercial purposes. Those entities can therefore be important players in value chains, which makes the security of their network and information systems an integral part of the overall cybersecurity of the internal market. Research organisations should be understood to include entities which focus the essential part of their activities on the conduct of applied research or experimental development, within the meaning of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Frascati Manual 2015: Guidelines for Collecting and Reporting Data on Research and Experimental Development, with a view to exploiting their results for commercial purposes, such as the manufacturing or development of a product or process, the provision of a service, or the marketing thereof.

    Relevant articles:6
  • 37

    The growing interdependencies are the result of an increasingly cross-border and interdependent network of service provision using key infrastructures across the Union in sectors such as energy, transport, digital infrastructure, drinking water and waste water, health, certain aspects of public administration, as well as space in so far as the provision of certain services depending on ground-based infrastructures that are owned, managed and operated either by Member States or by private parties is concerned, therefore not covering infrastructures owned, managed or operated by or on behalf of the Union as part of its space programme. Those interdependencies mean that any disruption, even one initially confined to one entity or one sector, can have cascading effects more broadly, potentially resulting in far-reaching and long-lasting negative impacts in the delivery of services across the internal market. The intensified cyberattacks during the COVID-19 pandemic have shown the vulnerability of increasingly interdependent societies in the face of low-probability risks.

    Relevant articles:12
  • 38

    In view of the differences in national governance structures and in order to safeguard already existing sectoral arrangements or Union supervisory and regulatory bodies, Member States should be able to designate or establish one or more competent authorities responsible for cybersecurity and for the supervisory tasks under this Directive.

    Relevant articles:8
  • 39

    In order to facilitate cross-border cooperation and communication among authorities and to enable this Directive to be implemented effectively, it is necessary for each Member State to designate a single point of contact responsible for coordinating issues related to the security of network and information systems and cross-border cooperation at Union level.

    Relevant articles:8
  • 40

    The single points of contact should ensure effective cross-border cooperation with relevant authorities of other Member States and, where appropriate, with the Commission and ENISA. The single points of contact should therefore be tasked with forwarding notifications of significant incidents with cross-border impact to the single points of contact of other affected Member States upon the request of the CSIRT or the competent authority. At national level, the single points of contact should enable smooth cross-sectoral cooperation with other competent authorities. The single points of contact could also be the addressees of relevant information about incidents concerning financial entities from the competent authorities under Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 which they should be able to forward, as appropriate, to the CSIRTs or the competent authorities under this Directive.

    Relevant articles:8
  • 41

    Member States should be adequately equipped, in terms of both technical and organisational capabilities, to prevent, detect, respond to and mitigate incidents and risks. Member States should therefore establish or designate one or more CSIRTs under this Directive and ensure that they have adequate resources and technical capabilities. The CSIRTs should comply with the requirements laid down in this Directive in order to guarantee effective and compatible capabilities to deal with incidents and risks and to ensure efficient cooperation at Union level. Member States should be able to designate existing computer emergency response teams (CERTs) as CSIRTs. In order to enhance the trust relationship between the entities and the CSIRTs, where a CSIRT is part of a competent authority, Member States should be able to consider functional separation between the operational tasks provided by the CSIRTs, in particular in relation to information sharing and assistance provided to the entities, and the supervisory activities of the competent authorities.

    Relevant articles:10
  • 42

    The CSIRTs are tasked with incident handling. This includes the processing of large volumes of sometimes sensitive data. Member States should ensure that the CSIRTs have an infrastructure for information sharing and processing, as well as well-equipped staff, which ensures the confidentiality and trustworthiness of their operations. The CSIRTs could also adopt codes of conduct in that respect.

    Relevant articles:11
  • 43

    As regards personal data, the CSIRTs should be able to provide, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679, upon the request of an essential or important entity, a proactive scanning of the network and information systems used for the provision of the entity’s services. Where applicable, Member States should aim to ensure an equal level of technical capabilities for all sectoral CSIRTs. Member States should be able to request the assistance of ENISA in developing their CSIRTs.

    Relevant articles:10
  • 44

    The CSIRTs should have the ability, upon an essential or important entity’s request, to monitor the entity’s internet-facing assets, both on and off premises, in order to identify, understand and manage the entity’s overall organisational risks as regards newly identified supply chain compromises or critical vulnerabilities. The entity should be encouraged to communicate to the CSIRT whether it runs a privileged management interface, as this could affect the speed of undertaking mitigating actions.

    Relevant articles:11
  • 45

    Given the importance of international cooperation on cybersecurity, the CSIRTs should be able to participate in international cooperation networks in addition to the CSIRTs network established by this Directive. Therefore, for the purpose of carrying out their tasks, the CSIRTs and the competent authorities should be able to exchange information, including personal data, with the national computer security incident response teams or competent authorities of third countries provided that the conditions under Union data protection law for transfers of personal data to third countries, inter alia those of Article 49 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, are met.

    Relevant articles:1015
  • 46

    Ensuring adequate resources to meet the objectives of this Directive and to enable the competent authorities and the CSIRTs to carry out the tasks laid down herein is essential. The Member States can introduce at the national level a financing mechanism to cover necessary expenditure in relation to the conduct of tasks of public entities responsible for cybersecurity in the Member State pursuant to this Directive. Such mechanism should comply with Union law and should be proportionate and non-discriminatory and should take into account different approaches to providing secure services.

    Relevant articles:11
  • 47

    The CSIRTs network should continue to contribute to strengthening confidence and trust and to promote swift and effective operational cooperation among Member States. In order to enhance operational cooperation at Union level, the CSIRTs network should consider inviting Union bodies and agencies involved in cybersecurity policy, such as Europol, to participate in its work.

    Relevant articles:1015
  • 48

    For the purpose of achieving and maintaining a high level of cybersecurity, the national cybersecurity strategies required under this Directive should consist of coherent frameworks providing strategic objectives and priorities in the area of cybersecurity and the governance to achieve them. Those strategies can be composed of one or more legislative or non-legislative instruments.

    Relevant articles:7
  • 49

    Cyber hygiene policies provide the foundations for protecting network and information system infrastructures, hardware, software and online application security, and business or end-user data upon which entities rely. Cyber hygiene policies comprising a common baseline set of practices, including software and hardware updates, password changes, the management of new installs, the limitation of administrator-level access accounts, and the backing-up of data, enable a proactive framework of preparedness and overall safety and security in the event of incidents or cyber threats. ENISA should monitor and analyse Member States’ cyber hygiene policies.

    Relevant articles:7
  • 50

    Cybersecurity awareness and cyber hygiene are essential to enhance the level of cybersecurity within the Union, in particular in light of the growing number of connected devices that are increasingly used in cyberattacks. Efforts should be made to enhance the overall awareness of risks related to such devices, while assessments at Union level could help ensure a common understanding of such risks within the internal market.

    Relevant articles:7
  • 51

    Member States should encourage the use of any innovative technology, including artificial intelligence, the use of which could improve the detection and prevention of cyberattacks, enabling resources to be diverted towards cyberattacks more effectively. Member States should therefore encourage in their national cybersecurity strategy activities in research and development to facilitate the use of such technologies, in particular those relating to automated or semi-automated tools in cybersecurity, and, where relevant, the sharing of data needed for training users of such technology and for improving it. The use of any innovative technology, including artificial intelligence, should comply with Union data protection law, including the data protection principles of data accuracy, data minimisation, fairness and transparency, and data security, such as state-of-the-art encryption. The requirements of data protection by design and by default laid down in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 should be fully exploited.

  • 52

    Open-source cybersecurity tools and applications can contribute to a higher degree of openness and can have a positive impact on the efficiency of industrial innovation. Open standards facilitate interoperability between security tools, benefitting the security of industrial stakeholders. Open-source cybersecurity tools and applications can leverage the wider developer community, enabling diversification of suppliers. Open source can lead to a more transparent verification process of cybersecurity related tools and a community-driven process of discovering vulnerabilities. Member States should therefore be able to promote the use of open-source software and open standards by pursuing policies relating to the use of open data and open-source as part of security through transparency. Policies promoting the introduction and sustainable use of open-source cybersecurity tools are of particular importance for small and medium-sized enterprises facing significant costs for implementation, which could be minimised by reducing the need for specific applications or tools.

    Relevant articles:7
  • 53

    Utilities are increasingly connected to digital networks in cities, for the purpose of improving urban transport networks, upgrading water supply and waste disposal facilities and increasing the efficiency of lighting and the heating of buildings. Those digitalised utilities are vulnerable to cyberattacks and run the risk, in the event of a successful cyberattack, of harming citizens at a large scale due to their interconnectedness. Member States should develop a policy that addresses the development of such connected or smart cities, and their potential effects on society, as part of their national cybersecurity strategy.

    Relevant articles:7
  • 54

    In recent years, the Union has faced an exponential increase in ransomware attacks, in which malware encrypts data and systems and demands a ransom payment for release. The increasing frequency and severity of ransomware attacks can be driven by several factors, such as different attack patterns, criminal business models around ‘ransomware as a service’ and cryptocurrencies, ransom demands, and the rise of supply chain attacks. Member States should develop a policy addressing the rise of ransomware attacks as part of their national cybersecurity strategy.

    Relevant articles:7
  • 55

    Public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the field of cybersecurity can provide an appropriate framework for knowledge exchange, the sharing of best practices and the establishment of a common level of understanding among stakeholders. Member States should promote policies underpinning the establishment of cybersecurity-specific PPPs. Those policies should clarify, inter alia, the scope and stakeholders involved, the governance model, the available funding options and the interaction among participating stakeholders with regard to PPPs. PPPs can leverage the expertise of private-sector entities to assist the competent authorities in developing state-of-the-art services and processes including information exchange, early warnings, cyber threat and incident exercises, crisis management and resilience planning.

    Relevant articles:7
  • 56

    Member States should, in their national cybersecurity strategies, address the specific cybersecurity needs of small and medium-sized enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises represent, across the Union, a large percentage of the industrial and business market and often struggle to adapt to new business practices in a more connected world and to the digital environment, with employees working from home and business increasingly being conducted online. Some small and medium-sized enterprises face specific cybersecurity challenges such as low cyber-awareness, a lack of remote IT security, the high cost of cybersecurity solutions and an increased level of threat, such as ransomware, for which they should receive guidance and assistance. Small and medium-sized enterprises are increasingly becoming the target of supply chain attacks due to their less rigorous cybersecurity risk-management measures and attack management, and the fact that they have limited security resources. Such supply chain attacks not only have an impact on small and medium-sized enterprises and their operations in isolation but can also have a cascading effect on larger attacks on entities to which they provided supplies. Member States should, through their national cybersecurity strategies, help small and medium-sized enterprises to address the challenges faced in their supply chains. Member States should have a point of contact for small and medium-sized enterprises at national or regional level, which either provides guidance and assistance to small and medium-sized enterprises or directs them to the appropriate bodies for guidance and assistance with regard to cybersecurity related issues. Member States are also encouraged to offer services such as website configuration and logging enabling to microenterprises and small enterprises that lack those capabilities.

    Relevant articles:7
  • 57

    As part of their national cybersecurity strategies, Member States should adopt policies on the promotion of active cyber protection as part of a wider defensive strategy. Rather than responding reactively, active cyber protection is the prevention, detection, monitoring, analysis and mitigation of network security breaches in an active manner, combined with the use of capabilities deployed within and outside the victim network. This could include Member States offering free services or tools to certain entities, including self-service checks, detection tools and takedown services. The ability to rapidly and automatically share and understand threat information and analysis, cyber activity alerts, and response action is critical to enable a unity of effort in successfully preventing, detecting, addressing and blocking attacks against network and information systems. Active cyber protection is based on a defensive strategy that excludes offensive measures.

    Relevant articles:7
  • 58

    Since the exploitation of vulnerabilities in network and information systems may cause significant disruption and harm, swiftly identifying and remedying such vulnerabilities is an important factor in reducing risk. Entities that develop or administer network and information systems should therefore establish appropriate procedures to handle vulnerabilities when they are discovered. Since vulnerabilities are often discovered and disclosed by third parties, the manufacturer or provider of ICT products or ICT services should also put in place the necessary procedures to receive vulnerability information from third parties. In that regard, international standards ISO/IEC 30111 and ISO/IEC 29147 provide guidance on vulnerability handling and vulnerability disclosure. Strengthening the coordination between reporting natural and legal persons and manufacturers or providers of ICT products or ICT services is particularly important for the purpose of facilitating the voluntary framework of vulnerability disclosure. Coordinated vulnerability disclosure specifies a structured process through which vulnerabilities are reported to the manufacturer or provider of the potentially vulnerable ICT products or ICT services in a manner allowing it to diagnose and remedy the vulnerability before detailed vulnerability information is disclosed to third parties or to the public. Coordinated vulnerability disclosure should also include coordination between the reporting natural or legal person and the manufacturer or provider of the potentially vulnerable ICT products or ICT services as regards the timing of remediation and publication of vulnerabilities.

    Relevant articles:12
  • 59

    The Commission, ENISA and the Member States should continue to foster alignments with international standards and existing industry best practices in the area of cybersecurity risk management, for example in the areas of supply chain security assessments, information sharing and vulnerability disclosure.

    Relevant articles:12
  • 60

    Member States, in cooperation with ENISA, should take measures to facilitate coordinated vulnerability disclosure by establishing a relevant national policy. As part of their national policy, Member States should aim to address, to the extent possible, the challenges faced by vulnerability researchers, including their potential exposure to criminal liability, in accordance with national law. Given that natural and legal persons researching vulnerabilities could in some Member States be exposed to criminal and civil liability, Member States are encouraged to adopt guidelines as regards the non-prosecution of information security researchers and an exemption from civil liability for their activities.

    Relevant articles:30
  • 61

    Member States should designate one of its CSIRTs as a coordinator, acting as a trusted intermediary between the reporting natural or legal persons and the manufacturers or providers of ICT products or ICT services, which are likely to be affected by the vulnerability, where necessary. The tasks of the CSIRT designated as coordinator should include identifying and contacting the entities concerned, assisting the natural or legal persons reporting a vulnerability, negotiating disclosure timelines and managing vulnerabilities that affect multiple entities (multi-party coordinated vulnerability disclosure). Where the reported vulnerability could have significant impact on entities in more than one Member State, the CSIRTs designated as coordinators should cooperate within the CSIRTs network, where appropriate.

    Relevant articles:12
  • 62

    Access to correct and timely information about vulnerabilities affecting ICT products and ICT services contributes to an enhanced cybersecurity risk management. Sources of publicly available information about vulnerabilities are an important tool for the entities and for the users of their services, but also for the competent authorities and the CSIRTs. For that reason, ENISA should establish a European vulnerability database where entities, regardless of whether they fall within the scope of this Directive, and their suppliers of network and information systems, as well as the competent authorities and the CSIRTs, can disclose and register, on a voluntary basis, publicly known vulnerabilities for the purpose of allowing users to take appropriate mitigating measures. The aim of that database is to address the unique challenges posed by risks to Union entities. Furthermore, ENISA should establish an appropriate procedure regarding the publication process in order to give entities the time to take mitigating measures as regards their vulnerabilities and employ state-of-the-art cybersecurity risk-management measures as well as machine-readable datasets and corresponding interfaces. To encourage a culture of disclosure of vulnerabilities, disclosure should have no detrimental effects on the reporting natural or legal person.

    Relevant articles:12
  • 63

    Although similar vulnerability registries or databases exist, they are hosted and maintained by entities which are not established in the Union. A European vulnerability database maintained by ENISA would provide improved transparency regarding the publication process before the vulnerability is publicly disclosed, and resilience in the event of a disruption or an interruption of the provision of similar services. In order, to the extent possible, to avoid a duplication of efforts and to seek complementarity, ENISA should explore the possibility of entering into structured cooperation agreements with similar registries or databases that fall under third-country jurisdiction. In particular, ENISA should explore the possibility of close cooperation with the operators of the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) system.

    Relevant articles:12
  • 64

    The Cooperation Group should support and facilitate strategic cooperation and the exchange of information, as well as strengthen trust and confidence among Member States. The Cooperation Group should establish a work programme every two years. The work programme should include the actions to be undertaken by the Cooperation Group to implement its objectives and tasks. The timeframe for the establishment of the first work programme under this Directive should be aligned with the timeframe of the last work programme established under Directive (EU) 2016/1148 in order to avoid potential disruptions in the work of the Cooperation Group.

    Relevant articles:14
  • 65

    When developing guidance documents, the Cooperation Group should consistently map national solutions and experiences, assess the impact of Cooperation Group deliverables on national approaches, discuss implementation challenges and formulate specific recommendations, in particular as regards facilitating an alignment of the transposition of this Directive among Member States, to be addressed through a better implementation of existing rules. The Cooperation Group could also map the national solutions in order to promote compatibility of cybersecurity solutions applied to each specific sector across the Union. This is particularly relevant to sectors that have an international or cross-border nature.

    Relevant articles:14
  • 66

    The Cooperation Group should remain a flexible forum and be able to react to changing and new policy priorities and challenges while taking into account the availability of resources. It could organise regular joint meetings with relevant private stakeholders from across the Union to discuss activities carried out by the Cooperation Group and gather data and input on emerging policy challenges. Additionally, the Cooperation Group should carry out a regular assessment of the state of play of cyber threats or incidents, such as ransomware. In order to enhance cooperation at Union level, the Cooperation Group should consider inviting relevant Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies involved in cybersecurity policy, such as the European Parliament, Europol, the European Data Protection Board, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, established by Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, and the European Union Agency for Space Programme, established by Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and the Council , to participate in its work.

    Relevant articles:14
  • 67

    The competent authorities and the CSIRTs should be able to participate in exchange schemes for officials from other Member States, within a specific framework and, where applicable, subject to the required security clearance of officials participating in such exchange schemes, in order to improve cooperation and strengthen trust among Member States. The competent authorities should take the necessary measures to enable officials from other Member States to play an effective role in the activities of the host competent authority or the host CSIRT.

    Relevant articles:14
  • 68

    Member States should contribute to the establishment of the EU Cybersecurity Crisis Response Framework as set out in Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584 through the existing cooperation networks, in particular the European cyber crisis liaison organisation network (EU-CyCLONe), the CSIRTs network and the Cooperation Group. EU-CyCLONe and the CSIRTs network should cooperate on the basis of procedural arrangements that specify the details of that cooperation and avoid any duplication of tasks. EU-CyCLONe’s rules of procedure should further specify the arrangements through which that network should function, including the network’s roles, means of cooperation, interactions with other relevant actors and templates for information sharing, as well as means of communication. For crisis management at Union level, relevant parties should rely on the EU Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements under Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1993 (IPCR arrangements). The Commission should use the ARGUS high-level cross-sectoral crisis coordination process for that purpose. If the crisis entails an important external or Common Security and Defence Policy dimension, the European External Action Service Crisis Response Mechanism should be activated.

    Relevant articles:15
  • 69

    In accordance with the Annex to Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584, a large-scale cybersecurity incident should mean an incident which causes a level of disruption that exceeds a Member State’s capacity to respond to it or which has a significant impact on at least two Member States. Depending on their cause and impact, large-scale cybersecurity incidents may escalate and turn into fully-fledged crises not allowing the proper functioning of the internal market or posing serious public security and safety risks for entities or citizens in several Member States or the Union as a whole. Given the wide-ranging scope and, in most cases, the cross-border nature of such incidents, Member States and the relevant Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies should cooperate at technical, operational and political level to properly coordinate the response across the Union.

    Relevant articles:916
  • 70

    Large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises at Union level require coordinated action to ensure a rapid and effective response because of the high degree of interdependence between sectors and Member States. The availability of cyber-resilient network and information systems and the availability, confidentiality and integrity of data are vital for the security of the Union and for the protection of its citizens, businesses and institutions against incidents and cyber threats, as well as for enhancing the trust of individuals and organisations in the Union’s ability to promote and protect a global, open, free, stable and secure cyberspace grounded in human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law.

    Relevant articles:916
  • 71

    EU-CyCLONe should work as an intermediary between the technical and political level during large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises and should enhance cooperation at operational level and support decision-making at political level. In cooperation with the Commission, having regard to the Commission’s competence in the area of crisis management, EU-CyCLONe should build on the CSIRTs network findings and use its own capabilities to create impact analysis of large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises.

    Relevant articles:16
  • 72

    Cyberattacks are of a cross-border nature, and a significant incident can disrupt and damage critical information infrastructures on which the smooth functioning of the internal market depends. Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584 addresses the role of all relevant actors. Furthermore, the Commission is responsible, within the framework of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, established by Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council , for general preparedness actions including managing the Emergency Response Coordination Centre and the Common Emergency Communication and Information System, maintaining and further developing situational awareness and analysis capability, and establishing and managing the capability to mobilise and dispatch expert teams in the event of a request for assistance from a Member State or third country. The Commission is also responsible for providing analytical reports for the IPCR arrangements under Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1993, including in relation to cybersecurity situational awareness and preparedness, as well as for situational awareness and crisis response in the areas of agriculture, adverse weather conditions, conflict mapping and forecasts, early warning systems for natural disasters, health emergencies, infection disease surveillance, plant health, chemical incidents, food and feed safety, animal health, migration, customs, nuclear and radiological emergencies, and energy.

  • 73

    The Union can, where appropriate, conclude international agreements, in accordance with Article 218 TFEU, with third countries or international organisations, allowing and organising their participation in particular activities of the Cooperation Group, the CSIRTs network and EU-CyCLONe. Such agreements should ensure the Union’s interests and the adequate protection of data. This should not preclude the right of Member States to cooperate with third countries on management of vulnerabilities and cybersecurity risk management, facilitating reporting and general information sharing in accordance with Union law.

    Relevant articles:17
  • 74

    In order to facilitate the effective implementation of this Directive with regard, inter alia, to the management of vulnerabilities, cybersecurity risk-management measures, reporting obligations and cybersecurity information-sharing arrangements, Member States can cooperate with third countries and undertake activities that are considered to be appropriate for that purpose, including information exchange on cyber threats, incidents, vulnerabilities, tools and methods, tactics, techniques and procedures, cybersecurity crisis management preparedness and exercises, training, trust building and structured information-sharing arrangements.

    Relevant articles:1017
  • 75

    Peer reviews should be introduced to help learn from shared experiences, strengthen mutual trust and achieve a high common level of cybersecurity. Peer reviews can lead to valuable insights and recommendations strengthening the overall cybersecurity capabilities, creating another functional path for the sharing of best practices across Member States and contributing to enhance the Member States’ levels of maturity in cybersecurity. Furthermore, peer reviews should take account of the results of similar mechanisms, such as the peer-review system of the CSIRTs network, and should add value and avoid duplication. The implementation of peer reviews should be without prejudice to Union or national law on the protection of confidential or classified information.

    Relevant articles:19
  • 76

    The Cooperation Group should establish a self-assessment methodology for Member States, aiming to cover factors such as the level of implementation of the cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations, the level of capabilities and the effectiveness of the exercise of the tasks of the competent authorities, the operational capabilities of the CSIRTs, the level of implementation of mutual assistance, the level of implementation of the cybersecurity information-sharing arrangements, or specific issues of cross-border or cross-sector nature. Member States should be encouraged to carry out self-assessments on a regular basis, and to present and discuss the results of their self-assessment within the Cooperation Group.

    Relevant articles:19
  • 77

    Responsibility for ensuring the security of network and information system lies, to a great extent, with essential and important entities. A culture of risk management, involving risk assessments and the implementation of cybersecurity risk-management measures appropriate to the risks faced, should be promoted and developed.

    Relevant articles:21
  • 78

    Cybersecurity risk-management measures should take into account the degree of dependence of the essential or important entity on network and information systems and include measures to identify any risks of incidents, to prevent, detect, respond to and recover from incidents and to mitigate their impact. The security of network and information systems should include the security of stored, transmitted and processed data. Cybersecurity risk-management measures should provide for systemic analysis, taking into account the human factor, in order to have a complete picture of the security of the network and information system.

    Relevant articles:21
  • 79

    As threats to the security of network and information systems can have different origins, cybersecurity risk-management measures should be based on an all-hazards approach, which aims to protect network and information systems and the physical environment of those systems from events such as theft, fire, flood, telecommunication or power failures, or unauthorised physical access and damage to, and interference with, an essential or important entity’s information and information processing facilities, which could compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored, transmitted or processed data or of the services offered by, or accessible via, network and information systems. The cybersecurity risk-management measures should therefore also address the physical and environmental security of network and information systems by including measures to protect such systems from system failures, human error, malicious acts or natural phenomena, in line with European and international standards, such as those included in the ISO/IEC 27000 series. In that regard, essential and important entities should, as part of their cybersecurity risk-management measures, also address human resources security and have in place appropriate access control policies. Those measures should be consistent with Directive (EU) 2022/2557.

    Relevant articles:21
  • 80

    For the purpose of demonstrating compliance with cybersecurity risk-management measures and in the absence of appropriate European cybersecurity certification schemes adopted in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council , Member States should, in consultation with the Cooperation Group and the European Cybersecurity Certification Group, promote the use of relevant European and international standards by essential and important entities or may require entities to use certified ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes.

    Relevant articles:21
  • 81

    In order to avoid imposing a disproportionate financial and administrative burden on essential and important entities, the cybersecurity risk-management measures should be proportionate to the risks posed to the network and information system concerned, taking into account the state-of-the-art of such measures, and, where applicable, relevant European and international standards, as well as the cost for their implementation.

    Relevant articles:21
  • 82

    Cybersecurity risk-management measures should be proportionate to the degree of the essential or important entity’s exposure to risks and to the societal and economic impact that an incident would have. When establishing cybersecurity risk-management measures adapted to essential and important entities, due account should be taken of the divergent risk exposure of essential and important entities, such as the criticality of the entity, the risks, including societal risks, to which it is exposed, the entity’s size and the likelihood of occurrence of incidents and their severity, including their societal and economic impact.

    Relevant articles:21
  • 83

    Essential and important entities should ensure the security of the network and information systems which they use in their activities. Those systems are primarily private network and information systems managed by the essential and important entities’ internal IT staff or the security of which has been outsourced. The cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations laid down in this Directive should apply to the relevant essential and important entities regardless of whether those entities maintain their network and information systems internally or outsource the maintenance thereof.

    Relevant articles:2021
  • 84

    Taking account of their cross-border nature, DNS service providers, TLD name registries, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service providers, managed security service providers, providers of online marketplaces, of online search engines and of social networking services platforms, and trust service providers should be subject to a high degree of harmonisation at Union level. The implementation of cybersecurity risk-management measures with regard to those entities should therefore be facilitated by an implementing act.

    Relevant articles:21
  • 85

    Addressing risks stemming from an entity’s supply chain and its relationship with its suppliers, such as providers of data storage and processing services or managed security service providers and software editors, is particularly important given the prevalence of incidents where entities have been the victim of cyberattacks and where malicious perpetrators were able to compromise the security of an entity’s network and information systems by exploiting vulnerabilities affecting third-party products and services. Essential and important entities should therefore assess and take into account the overall quality and resilience of products and services, the cybersecurity risk-management measures embedded in them, and the cybersecurity practices of their suppliers and service providers, including their secure development procedures. Essential and important entities should in particular be encouraged to incorporate cybersecurity risk-management measures into contractual arrangements with their direct suppliers and service providers. Those entities could consider risks stemming from other levels of suppliers and service providers.

    Relevant articles:21
  • 86

    Among service providers, managed security service providers in areas such as incident response, penetration testing, security audits and consultancy play a particularly important role in assisting entities in their efforts to prevent, detect, respond to or recover from incidents. Managed security service providers have however also themselves been the target of cyberattacks and, because of their close integration in the operations of entities pose a particular risk. Essential and important entities should therefore exercise increased diligence in selecting a managed security service provider.

    Relevant articles:21
  • 87

    The competent authorities, in the context of their supervisory tasks, may also benefit from cybersecurity services such as security audits, penetration testing or incident responses.

    Relevant articles:21
  • 88

    Essential and important entities should also address risks stemming from their interactions and relationships with other stakeholders within a broader ecosystem, including with regard to countering industrial espionage and protecting trade secrets. In particular, those entities should take appropriate measures to ensure that their cooperation with academic and research institutions takes place in line with their cybersecurity policies and follows good practices as regards secure access and dissemination of information in general and the protection of intellectual property in particular. Similarly, given the importance and value of data for the activities of essential and important entities, when relying on data transformation and data analytics services from third parties, those entities should take all appropriate cybersecurity risk-management measures.

    Relevant articles:29
  • 89

    Essential and important entities should adopt a wide range of basic cyber hygiene practices, such as zero-trust principles, software updates, device configuration, network segmentation, identity and access management or user awareness, organise training for their staff and raise awareness concerning cyber threats, phishing or social engineering techniques. Furthermore, those entities should evaluate their own cybersecurity capabilities and, where appropriate, pursue the integration of cybersecurity enhancing technologies, such as artificial intelligence or machine-learning systems to enhance their capabilities and the security of network and information systems.

    Relevant articles:20
  • 90

    To further address key supply chain risks and assist essential and important entities operating in sectors covered by this Directive to appropriately manage supply chain and supplier related risks, the Cooperation Group, in cooperation with the Commission and ENISA, and where appropriate after consulting relevant stakeholders including from the industry, should carry out coordinated security risk assessments of critical supply chains, as carried out for 5G networks following Commission Recommendation (EU) 2019/534 , with the aim of identifying, per sector, the critical ICT services, ICT systems or ICT products, relevant threats and vulnerabilities. Such coordinated security risk assessments should identify measures, mitigation plans and best practices to counter critical dependencies, potential single points of failure, threats, vulnerabilities and other risks associated with the supply chain and should explore ways to further encourage their wider adoption by essential and important entities. Potential non-technical risk factors, such as undue influence by a third country on suppliers and service providers, in particular in the case of alternative models of governance, include concealed vulnerabilities or backdoors and potential systemic supply disruptions, in particular in the case of technological lock-in or provider dependency.

    Relevant articles:22
  • 91

    The coordinated security risk assessments of critical supply chains, in light of the features of the sector concerned, should take into account both technical and, where relevant, non-technical factors including those defined in Recommendation (EU) 2019/534, in the EU coordinated risk assessment of the cybersecurity of 5G networks and in the EU Toolbox on 5G cybersecurity agreed by the Cooperation Group. To identify the supply chains that should be subject to a coordinated security risk assessment, the following criteria should be taken into account: (i) the extent to which essential and important entities use and rely on specific critical ICT services, ICT systems or ICT products; (ii) the relevance of specific critical ICT services, ICT systems or ICT products for performing critical or sensitive functions, including the processing of personal data; (iii) the availability of alternative ICT services, ICT systems or ICT products; (iv) the resilience of the overall supply chain of ICT services, ICT systems or ICT products throughout their lifecycle against disruptive events; and (v) for emerging ICT services, ICT systems or ICT products, their potential future significance for the entities’ activities. Furthermore, particular emphasis should be placed on ICT services, ICT systems or ICT products that are subject to specific requirements stemming from third countries.

    Relevant articles:22
  • 92

    In order to streamline the obligations imposed on providers of public electronic communications networks or of publicly available electronic communications services, and trust service providers, related to the security of their network and information systems, as well as to enable those entities and the competent authorities under Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 respectively to benefit from the legal framework established by this Directive, including the designation of a CSIRT responsible for incident handling, the participation of the competent authorities concerned in the activities of the Cooperation Group and the CSIRTs network, those entities should fall within the scope of this Directive. The corresponding provisions laid down in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972 related to the imposition of security and notification requirements on those types of entity should therefore be deleted. The rules on reporting obligations laid down in this Directive should be without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC.

    Relevant articles:26
  • 93

    The cybersecurity obligations laid down in this Directive should be considered to be complementary to the requirements imposed on trust service providers under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014. Trust service providers should be required to take all appropriate and proportionate measures to manage the risks posed to their services, including in relation to customers and relying third parties, and to report incidents under this Directive. Such cybersecurity and reporting obligations should also concern the physical protection of the services provided. The requirements for qualified trust service providers laid down in Article 24 of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 continue to apply.

    Relevant articles:22342
  • 94

    Member States can assign the role of the competent authorities for trust services to the supervisory bodies under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 in order to ensure the continuation of current practices and to build on the knowledge and experience gained in the application of that Regulation. In such a case, the competent authorities under this Directive should cooperate closely and in a timely manner with those supervisory bodies by exchanging relevant information in order to ensure effective supervision and compliance of trust service providers with the requirements laid down in this Directive and in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014. Where applicable, the CSIRT or the competent authority under this Directive should immediately inform the supervisory body under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 about any notified significant cyber threat or incident affecting trust services as well as about any infringements by a trust service provider of this Directive. For the purpose of reporting, Member States can, where applicable, use the single entry point established to achieve a common and automatic incident reporting to both the supervisory body under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and the CSIRT or the competent authority under this Directive.

    Relevant articles:23
  • 95

    Where appropriate and in order to avoid unnecessary disruption, existing national guidelines adopted for the transposition of the rules related to security measures laid down in Articles 40 and 41 of Directive (EU) 2018/1972 should be taken into account in the transposition of this Directive, thereby building on the knowledge and skills already acquired under Directive (EU) 2018/1972 concerning security measures and incident notifications. ENISA can also develop guidance on security requirements and on reporting obligations for providers of public electronic communications networks or of publicly available electronic communications services to facilitate harmonisation and transition and to minimise disruption. Member States can assign the role of the competent authorities for electronic communications to the national regulatory authorities under Directive (EU) 2018/1972 in order to ensure the continuation of current practices and to build on the knowledge and experience gained as a result of the implementation of that Directive.

    Relevant articles:2643
  • 96

    Given the growing importance of number-independent interpersonal communications services as defined in Directive (EU) 2018/1972, it is necessary to ensure that such services are also subject to appropriate security requirements in view of their specific nature and economic importance. As the attack surface continues to expand, number-independent interpersonal communications services, such as messaging services, are becoming widespread attack vectors. Malicious perpetrators use platforms to communicate and attract victims to open compromised web pages, therefore increasing the likelihood of incidents involving the exploitation of personal data, and, by extension, the security of network and information systems. Providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services should ensure a level of security of network and information systems appropriate to the risks posed. Given that providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services normally do not exercise actual control over the transmission of signals over networks, the degree of risks posed to such services can be considered in some respects to be lower than for traditional electronic communications services. The same applies to interpersonal communications services as defined in Directive (EU) 2018/1972 which make use of numbers and which do not exercise actual control over signal transmission.

    Relevant articles:32
  • 97

    The internal market is more reliant on the functioning of the internet than ever. The services of almost all essential and important entities are dependent on services provided over the internet. In order to ensure the smooth provision of services provided by essential and important entities, it is important that all providers of public electronic communications networks have appropriate cybersecurity risk-management measures in place and report significant incidents in relation thereto. Member States should ensure that the security of the public electronic communications networks is maintained and that their vital security interests are protected from sabotage and espionage. Since international connectivity enhances and accelerates the competitive digitalisation of the Union and its economy, incidents affecting undersea communications cables should be reported to the CSIRT or, where applicable, the competent authority. The national cybersecurity strategy should, where relevant, take into account the cybersecurity of undersea communications cables and include a mapping of potential cybersecurity risks and mitigation measures to secure the highest level of their protection.

    Relevant articles:32
  • 98

    In order to safeguard the security of public electronic communications networks and publicly available electronic communications services, the use of encryption technologies, in particular end-to-end encryption as well as data-centric security concepts, such as cartography, segmentation, tagging, access policy and access management, and automated access decisions, should be promoted. Where necessary, the use of encryption, in particular end-to-end encryption should be mandatory for providers of public electronic communications networks or of publicly available electronic communications services in accordance with the principles of security and privacy by default and by design for the purposes of this Directive. The use of end-to-end encryption should be reconciled with the Member States’ powers to ensure the protection of their essential security interests and public security, and to allow for the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences in accordance with Union law. However, this should not weaken end-to-end encryption, which is a critical technology for the effective protection of data and privacy and the security of communications.

    Relevant articles:2132
  • 99

    In order to safeguard the security, and to prevent abuse and manipulation, of public electronic communications networks and of publicly available electronic communications services, the use of secure routing standards should be promoted to ensure the integrity and robustness of routing functions across the ecosystem of internet access service providers.

    Relevant articles:32
  • 100

    In order to safeguard the functionality and integrity of the internet and to promote the security and resilience of the DNS, relevant stakeholders including Union private-sector entities, providers of publicly available electronic communications services, in particular internet access service providers, and providers of online search engines should be encouraged to adopt a DNS resolution diversification strategy. Furthermore, Member States should encourage the development and use of a public and secure European DNS resolver service.

  • 101

    This Directive lays down a multiple-stage approach to the reporting of significant incidents in order to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, swift reporting that helps mitigate the potential spread of significant incidents and allows essential and important entities to seek assistance, and, on the other, in-depth reporting that draws valuable lessons from individual incidents and improves over time the cyber resilience of individual entities and entire sectors. In that regard, this Directive should include the reporting of incidents that, based on an initial assessment carried out by the entity concerned, could cause severe operational disruption of the services or financial loss for that entity or affect other natural or legal persons by causing considerable material or non-material damage. Such initial assessment should take into account, inter alia, the affected network and information systems, in particular their importance in the provision of the entity’s services, the severity and technical characteristics of a cyber threat and any underlying vulnerabilities that are being exploited as well as the entity’s experience with similar incidents. Indicators such as the extent to which the functioning of the service is affected, the duration of an incident or the number of affected recipients of services could play an important role in identifying whether the operational disruption of the service is severe.

    Relevant articles:23
  • 102

    Where essential or important entities become aware of a significant incident, they should be required to submit an early warning without undue delay and in any event within 24 hours. That early warning should be followed by an incident notification. The entities concerned should submit an incident notification without undue delay and in any event within 72 hours of becoming aware of the significant incident, with the aim, in particular, of updating information submitted through the early warning and indicating an initial assessment of the significant incident, including its severity and impact, as well as indicators of compromise, where available. A final report should be submitted not later than one month after the incident notification. The early warning should only include the information necessary to make the CSIRT, or where applicable the competent authority, aware of the significant incident and allow the entity concerned to seek assistance, if required. Such early warning, where applicable, should indicate whether the significant incident is suspected of being caused by unlawful or malicious acts, and whether it is likely to have a cross-border impact. Member States should ensure that the obligation to submit that early warning, or the subsequent incident notification, does not divert the notifying entity’s resources from activities related to incident handling that should be prioritised, in order to prevent incident reporting obligations from either diverting resources from significant incident response handling or otherwise compromising the entity’s efforts in that respect. In the event of an ongoing incident at the time of the submission of the final report, Member States should ensure that entities concerned provide a progress report at that time, and a final report within one month of their handling of the significant incident.

    Relevant articles:23
  • 103

    Where applicable, essential and important entities should communicate, without undue delay, to their service recipients any measures or remedies that they can take to mitigate the resulting risks from a significant cyber threat. Those entities should, where appropriate and in particular where the significant cyber threat is likely to materialise, also inform their service recipients of the threat itself. The requirement to inform those recipients of significant cyber threats should be met on a best efforts basis but should not discharge those entities from the obligation to take, at their own expense, appropriate and immediate measures to prevent or remedy any such threats and restore the normal security level of the service. The provision of such information about significant cyber threats to the service recipients should be free of charge and drafted in easily comprehensible language.

    Relevant articles:23
  • 104

    Providers of public electronic communications networks or of publicly available electronic communications services should implement security by design and by default, and inform their service recipients of significant cyber threats and of measures they can take to protect the security of their devices and communications, for example by using specific types of software or encryption technologies.

    Relevant articles:23
  • 105

    A proactive approach to cyber threats is a vital component of cybersecurity risk management that should enable the competent authorities to effectively prevent cyber threats from materialising into incidents that may cause considerable material or non-material damage. For that purpose, the notification of cyber threats is of key importance. To that end, entities are encouraged to report on a voluntary basis cyber threats.

    Relevant articles:30
  • 106

    In order to simplify the reporting of information required under this Directive as well as to decrease the administrative burden for entities, Member States should provide technical means such as a single entry point, automated systems, online forms, user-friendly interfaces, templates, dedicated platforms for the use of entities, regardless of whether they fall within the scope of this Directive, for the submission of the relevant information to be reported. Union funding supporting the implementation of this Directive, in particular within the Digital Europe programme, established by Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council , could include support for single entry points. Furthermore, entities are often in a situation where a particular incident, because of its features, needs to be reported to various authorities as a result of notification obligations included in various legal instruments. Such cases create additional administrative burden and could also lead to uncertainties with regard to the format and procedures of such notifications. Where a single entry point is established, Member States are encouraged also to use that single entry point for notifications of security incidents required under other Union law, such as Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC. The use of such single entry point for reporting of security incidents under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC should not affect the application of the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, in particular those relating to the independence of the authorities referred to therein. ENISA, in cooperation with the Cooperation Group, should develop common notification templates by means of guidelines to simplify and streamline the information to be reported under Union law and decrease the administrative burden on notifying entities.

    Relevant articles:23
  • 107

    Where it is suspected that an incident is related to serious criminal activities under Union or national law, Member States should encourage essential and important entities, on the basis of applicable criminal proceedings rules in accordance with Union law, to report incidents of a suspected serious criminal nature to the relevant law enforcement authorities. Where appropriate, and without prejudice to the personal data protection rules applying to Europol, it is desirable that coordination between the competent authorities and the law enforcement authorities of different Member States be facilitated by the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) and ENISA.

    Relevant articles:23
  • 108

    Personal data are in many cases compromised as a result of incidents. In that context, the competent authorities should cooperate and exchange information about all relevant matters with the authorities referred to in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC.

  • 109

    Maintaining accurate and complete databases of domain name registration data (WHOIS data) and providing lawful access to such data is essential to ensure the security, stability and resilience of the DNS, which in turn contributes to a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union. For that specific purpose, TLD name registries and entities providing domain name registration services should be required to process certain data necessary to achieve that purpose. Such processing should constitute a legal obligation within the meaning of Article 6(1), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. That obligation is without prejudice to the possibility to collect domain name registration data for other purposes, for example on the basis of contractual arrangements or legal requirements established in other Union or national law. That obligation aims to achieve a complete and accurate set of registration data and should not result in collecting the same data multiple times. The TLD name registries and the entities providing domain name registration services should cooperate with each other in order to avoid the duplication of that task.

    Relevant articles:27
  • 110

    The availability and timely accessibility of domain name registration data to legitimate access seekers is essential for the prevention and combating of DNS abuse, and for the prevention and detection of and response to incidents. Legitimate access seekers are to be understood as any natural or legal person making a request pursuant to Union or national law. They can include authorities that are competent under this Directive and those that are competent under Union or national law for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences, and CERTs or CSIRTs. TLD name registries and entities providing domain name registration services should be required to enable lawful access to specific domain name registration data, which are necessary for the purposes of the access request, to legitimate access seekers in accordance with Union and national law. The request of legitimate access seekers should be accompanied by a statement of reasons permitting the assessment of the necessity of access to the data.

    Relevant articles:27
  • 111

    In order to ensure the availability of accurate and complete domain name registration data, TLD name registries and entities providing domain name registration services should collect and guarantee the integrity and availability of domain name registration data. In particular, TLD name registries and entities providing domain name registration services should establish policies and procedures to collect and maintain accurate and complete domain name registration data, as well as to prevent and correct inaccurate registration data, in accordance with Union data protection law. Those policies and procedures should take into account, to the extent possible, the standards developed by the multi-stakeholder governance structures at international level. The TLD name registries and the entities providing domain name registration services should adopt and implement proportionate procedures to verify domain name registration data. Those procedures should reflect the best practices used within the industry and, to the extent possible, the progress made in the field of electronic identification. Examples of verification procedures may include controls carried out at the time of the registration and controls carried out after the registration. The TLD name registries and the entities providing domain name registration services should, in particular, verify at least one means of contact of the registrant.

    Relevant articles:28
  • 112

    TLD name registries and entities providing domain name registration services should be required to make publicly available domain name registration data that fall outside the scope of Union data protection law, such as data that concern legal persons, in line with the preamble of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. For legal persons, the TLD name registries and the entities providing domain name registration services should make publicly available at least the name of the registrant and the contact telephone number. The contact email address should also be published, provided that it does not contain any personal data, such as in the case of email aliases or functional accounts. TLD name registries and entities providing domain name registration services should also enable lawful access to specific domain name registration data concerning natural persons to legitimate access seekers, in accordance with Union data protection law. Member States should require TLD name registries and entities providing domain name registration services to respond without undue delay to requests for the disclosure of domain name registration data from legitimate access seekers. TLD name registries and entities providing domain name registration services should establish policies and procedures for the publication and disclosure of registration data, including service level agreements to deal with requests for access from legitimate access seekers. Those policies and procedures should take into account, to the extent possible, any guidance and the standards developed by the multi-stakeholder governance structures at international level. The access procedure could include the use of an interface, portal or other technical tool to provide an efficient system for requesting and accessing registration data. With a view to promoting harmonised practices across the internal market, the Commission can, without prejudice to the competences of the European Data Protection Board, provide guidelines with regard to such procedures, which take into account, to the extent possible, the standards developed by the multi-stakeholder governance structures at international level. Member States should ensure that all types of access to personal and non-personal domain name registration data are free of charge.

    Relevant articles:28
  • 113

    Entities falling within the scope of this Directive should be considered to fall under the jurisdiction of the Member State in which they are established. However, providers of public electronic communications networks or providers of publicly available electronic communications services should be considered to fall under the jurisdiction of the Member State in which they provide their services. DNS service providers, TLD name registries, entities providing domain name registration services, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service providers, managed security service providers, as well as providers of online marketplaces, of online search engines and of social networking services platforms should be considered to fall under the jurisdiction of the Member State in which they have their main establishment in the Union. Public administration entities should fall under the jurisdiction of the Member State which established them. If the entity provides services or is established in more than one Member State, it should fall under the separate and concurrent jurisdiction of each of those Member States. The competent authorities of those Member States should cooperate, provide mutual assistance to each other and, where appropriate, carry out joint supervisory actions. Where Member States exercise jurisdiction, they should not impose enforcement measures or penalties more than once for the same conduct, in line with the principle of .

    Relevant articles:26
  • 114

    In order to take account of the cross-border nature of the services and operations of DNS service providers, TLD name registries, entities providing domain name registration services, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service providers, managed security service providers, as well as providers of online marketplaces, of online search engines and of social networking services platforms, only one Member State should have jurisdiction over those entities. Jurisdiction should be attributed to the Member State in which the entity concerned has its main establishment in the Union. The criterion of establishment for the purposes of this Directive implies the effective exercise of activity through stable arrangements. The legal form of such arrangements, whether through a branch or a subsidiary with a legal personality, is not the determining factor in that respect. Whether that criterion is fulfilled should not depend on whether the network and information systems are physically located in a given place; the presence and use of such systems do not, in themselves, constitute such main establishment and are therefore not decisive criteria for determining the main establishment. The main establishment should be considered to be in the Member State where the decisions related to the cybersecurity risk-management measures are predominantly taken in the Union. This will typically correspond to the place of the entities’ central administration in the Union. If such a Member State cannot be determined or if such decisions are not taken in the Union, the main establishment should be considered to be in the Member State where cybersecurity operations are carried out. If such a Member State cannot be determined, the main establishment should be considered to be in the Member State where the entity has the establishment with the highest number of employees in the Union. Where the services are carried out by a group of undertakings, the main establishment of the controlling undertaking should be considered to be the main establishment of the group of undertakings.

    Relevant articles:26
  • 115

    Where a publicly available recursive DNS service is provided by a provider of public electronic communications networks or of publicly available electronic communications services only as a part of the internet access service, the entity should be considered to fall under the jurisdiction of all the Member States where its services are provided.

    Relevant articles:26
  • 116

    Where a DNS service provider, a TLD name registry, an entity providing domain name registration services, a cloud computing service provider, a data centre service provider, a content delivery network provider, a managed service provider, a managed security service provider or a provider of an online marketplace, of an online search engine or of a social networking services platform, which is not established in the Union, offers services within the Union, it should designate a representative in the Union. In order to determine whether such an entity is offering services within the Union, it should be ascertained whether the entity is planning to offer services to persons in one or more Member States. The mere accessibility in the Union of the entity’s or an intermediary’s website or of an email address or other contact details, or the use of a language generally used in the third country where the entity is established, should be considered to be insufficient to ascertain such an intention. However, factors such as the use of a language or a currency generally used in one or more Member States with the possibility of ordering services in that language, or the mentioning of customers or users who are in the Union, could make it apparent that the entity is planning to offer services within the Union. The representative should act on behalf of the entity and it should be possible for the competent authorities or the CSIRTs to address the representative. The representative should be explicitly designated by a written mandate of the entity to act on the latter’s behalf with regard to the latter’s obligations laid down in this Directive, including incident reporting.

    Relevant articles:26
  • 117

    In order to ensure a clear overview of DNS service providers, TLD name registries, entities providing domain name registration services, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service providers, managed security service providers, as well as providers of online marketplaces, of online search engines and of social networking services platforms, which provide services across the Union that fall within the scope of this Directive, ENISA should create and maintain a registry of such entities, based on the information received by Member States, where applicable through national mechanisms established for entities to register themselves. The single points of contact should forward to ENISA the information and any changes thereto. With a view to ensuring the accuracy and completeness of the information that is to be included in that registry, Member States can submit to ENISA the information available in any national registries on those entities. ENISA and the Member States should take measures to facilitate the interoperability of such registries, while ensuring protection of confidential or classified information. ENISA should establish appropriate information classification and management protocols to ensure the security and confidentiality of disclosed information and restrict the access, storage, and transmission of such information to intended users.

    Relevant articles:27
  • 118

    Where information which is classified in accordance with Union or national law is exchanged, reported or otherwise shared under this Directive, the corresponding rules on the handling of classified information should be applied. In addition, ENISA should have the infrastructure, procedures and rules in place to handle sensitive and classified information in accordance with the applicable security rules for protecting EU classified information.

    Relevant articles:29
  • 119

    With cyber threats becoming more complex and sophisticated, good detection of such threats and their prevention measures depend to a large extent on regular threat and vulnerability intelligence sharing between entities. Information sharing contributes to an increased awareness of cyber threats, which, in turn, enhances entities’ capacity to prevent such threats from materialising into incidents and enables entities to better contain the effects of incidents and recover more efficiently. In the absence of guidance at Union level, various factors seem to have inhibited such intelligence sharing, in particular uncertainty over the compatibility with competition and liability rules.

    Relevant articles:29
  • 120

    Entities should be encouraged and assisted by Member States to collectively leverage their individual knowledge and practical experience at strategic, tactical and operational levels with a view to enhancing their capabilities to adequately prevent, detect, respond to or recover from incidents or to mitigate their impact. It is thus necessary to enable the emergence at Union level of voluntary cybersecurity information-sharing arrangements. To that end, Member States should actively assist and encourage entities, such as those providing cybersecurity services and research, as well as relevant entities not falling within the scope of this Directive, to participate in such cybersecurity information-sharing arrangements. Those arrangements should be established in accordance with the Union competition rules and Union data protection law.

    Relevant articles:29
  • 121

    The processing of personal data, to the extent necessary and proportionate for the purpose of ensuring security of network and information systems by essential and important entities, could be considered to be lawful on the basis that such processing complies with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject, in accordance with the requirements of Article 6(1), point (c), and Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Processing of personal data could also be necessary for legitimate interests pursued by essential and important entities, as well as providers of security technologies and services acting on behalf of those entities, pursuant to Article 6(1), point (f), of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, including where such processing is necessary for cybersecurity information-sharing arrangements or the voluntary notification of relevant information in accordance with this Directive. Measures related to the prevention, detection, identification, containment, analysis and response to incidents, measures to raise awareness in relation to specific cyber threats, exchange of information in the context of vulnerability remediation and coordinated vulnerability disclosure, the voluntary exchange of information about those incidents, and cyber threats and vulnerabilities, indicators of compromise, tactics, techniques and procedures, cybersecurity alerts and configuration tools could require the processing of certain categories of personal data, such as IP addresses, uniform resources locators (URLs), domain names, email addresses and, where they reveal personal data, time stamps. Processing of personal data by the competent authorities, the single points of contact and the CSIRTs, could constitute a legal obligation or be considered to be necessary for carrying out a task in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller pursuant to Article 6(1), point (c) or (e), and Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, or for pursuing a legitimate interest of the essential and important entities, as referred to in Article 6(1), point (f), of that Regulation. Furthermore, national law could lay down rules allowing the competent authorities, the single points of contact and the CSIRTs, to the extent that is necessary and proportionate for the purpose of ensuring the security of network and information systems of essential and important entities, to process special categories of personal data in accordance with Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, in particular by providing for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and interests of natural persons, including technical limitations on the re-use of such data and the use of state-of-the-art security and privacy-preserving measures, such as pseudonymisation, or encryption where anonymisation may significantly affect the purpose pursued.

    Relevant articles:231
  • 122

    In order to strengthen the supervisory powers and measures that help ensure effective compliance, this Directive should provide for a minimum list of supervisory measures and means through which the competent authorities can supervise essential and important entities. In addition, this Directive should establish a differentiation of supervisory regime between essential and important entities with a view to ensuring a fair balance of obligations on those entities and on the competent authorities. Therefore, essential entities should be subject to a comprehensive and supervisory regime, while important entities should be subject to a light, only, supervisory regime. Important entities should therefore not be required to systematically document compliance with cybersecurity risk-management measures, while the competent authorities should implement a reactive approach to supervision and, hence, not have a general obligation to supervise those entities. The supervision of important entities may be triggered by evidence, indication or information brought to the attention of the competent authorities considered by those authorities to suggest potential infringements of this Directive. For example, such evidence, indication or information could be of the type provided to the competent authorities by other authorities, entities, citizens, media or other sources or publicly available information, or could emerge from other activities conducted by the competent authorities in the fulfilment of their tasks.

    Relevant articles:313233
  • 123

    The execution of supervisory tasks by the competent authorities should not unnecessarily hamper the business activities of the entity concerned. Where the competent authorities execute their supervisory tasks in relation to essential entities, including the conduct of on-site inspections and off-site supervision, the investigation of infringements of this Directive and the conduct of security audits or security scans, they should minimise the impact on the business activities of the entity concerned.

    Relevant articles:32
  • 124

    In the exercise of supervision, the competent authorities should be able to decide on the prioritisation of the use of supervisory measures and means at their disposal in a proportionate manner. This entails that the competent authorities can decide on such prioritisation based on supervisory methodologies which should follow a risk-based approach. More specifically, such methodologies could include criteria or benchmarks for the classification of essential entities into risk categories and corresponding supervisory measures and means recommended per risk category, such as the use, frequency or types of on-site inspections, targeted security audits or security scans, the type of information to be requested and the level of detail of that information. Such supervisory methodologies could also be accompanied by work programmes and be assessed and reviewed on a regular basis, including on aspects such as resource allocation and needs. In relation to public administration entities, the supervisory powers should be exercised in line with the national legislative and institutional frameworks.

    Relevant articles:32
  • 125

    The competent authorities should ensure that their supervisory tasks in relation to essential and important entities are carried out by trained professionals, who should have the necessary skills to carry out those tasks, in particular with regard to conducting on-site inspections and off-site supervision, including the identification of weaknesses in databases, hardware, firewalls, encryption and networks. Those inspections and that supervision should be conducted in an objective manner.

    Relevant articles:3233
  • 126

    In duly substantiated cases where it is aware of a significant cyber threat or an imminent risk, the competent authority should be able to take immediate enforcement decisions with the aim of preventing or responding to an incident.

    Relevant articles:32
  • 127

    In order to make enforcement effective, a minimum list of enforcement powers that can be exercised for breach of the cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations provided for in this Directive should be laid down, setting up a clear and consistent framework for such enforcement across the Union. Due regard should be given to the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement of this Directive, the material or non-material damage caused, whether the infringement was intentional or negligent, actions taken to prevent or mitigate the material or non-material damage, the degree of responsibility or any relevant previous infringements, the degree of cooperation with the competent authority and any other aggravating or mitigating factor. The enforcement measures, including administrative fines, should be proportionate and their imposition should be subject to appropriate procedural safeguards in accordance with the general principles of Union law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), including the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence and the rights of the defence.

    Relevant articles:3233
  • 128

    This Directive does not require Member States to provide for criminal or civil liability with regard to natural persons with responsibility for ensuring that an entity complies with this Directive for damage suffered by third parties as a result of an infringement of this Directive.

    Relevant articles:32
  • 129

    In order to ensure effective enforcement of the obligations laid down in this Directive, each competent authority should have the power to impose or request the imposition of administrative fines.

    Relevant articles:34
  • 130

    Where an administrative fine is imposed on an essential or important entity that is an undertaking, an undertaking should be understood to be an undertaking in accordance with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU for those purposes. Where an administrative fine is imposed on a person that is not an undertaking, the competent authority should take account of the general level of income in the Member State as well as the economic situation of the person when considering the appropriate amount of the fine. It should be for the Member States to determine whether and to what extent public authorities should be subject to administrative fines. Imposing an administrative fine does not affect the application of other powers of the competent authorities or of other penalties laid down in the national rules transposing this Directive.

    Relevant articles:34
  • 131

    Member States should be able to lay down the rules on criminal penalties for infringements of the national rules transposing this Directive. However, the imposition of criminal penalties for infringements of such national rules and of related administrative penalties should not lead to a breach of the principle of , as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union.

    Relevant articles:36
  • 132

    Where this Directive does not harmonise administrative penalties or where necessary in other cases, for example in the event of a serious infringement of this Directive, Member States should implement a system which provides for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties. The nature of such penalties and whether they are criminal or administrative should be determined by national law.

    Relevant articles:36
  • 133

    In order to further strengthen the effectiveness and dissuasiveness of the enforcement measures applicable to infringements of this Directive, the competent authorities should be empowered to suspend temporarily or to request the temporary suspension of a certification or authorisation concerning part or all of the relevant services provided or activities carried out by an essential entity and request the imposition of a temporary prohibition of the exercise of managerial functions by any natural person discharging managerial responsibilities at chief executive officer or legal representative level. Given their severity and impact on the entities’ activities and ultimately on users, such temporary suspensions or prohibitions should only be applied proportionally to the severity of the infringement and taking account of the circumstances of each individual case, including whether the infringement was intentional or negligent, and any actions taken to prevent or mitigate the material or non-material damage. Such temporary suspensions or prohibitions should only be applied as a last resort, namely only after the other relevant enforcement measures laid down in this Directive have been exhausted, and only until the entity concerned takes the necessary action to remedy the deficiencies or comply with the requirements of the competent authority for which such temporary suspensions or prohibitions were applied. The imposition of such temporary suspensions or prohibitions should be subject to appropriate procedural safeguards in accordance with the general principles of Union law and the Charter, including the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence and the rights of the defence.

    Relevant articles:32
  • 134

    For the purpose of ensuring entities’ compliance with their obligations laid down in this Directive, Member States should cooperate with and assist each other with regard to supervisory and enforcement measures, in particular where an entity provides services in more than one Member State or where its network and information systems are located in a Member State other than that where it provides services. When providing assistance, the requested competent authority should take supervisory or enforcement measures in accordance with national law. In order to ensure the smooth functioning of mutual assistance under this Directive, the competent authorities should use the Cooperation Group as a forum to discuss cases and particular requests for assistance.

    Relevant articles:37
  • 135

    In order to ensure effective supervision and enforcement, in particular in a situation with a cross-border dimension, a Member State that has received a request for mutual assistance should, within the limits of that request, take appropriate supervisory and enforcement measures in relation to the entity that is the subject of that request, and that provides services or has a network and information system on the territory of that Member State.

    Relevant articles:37
  • 136

    This Directive should establish cooperation rules between the competent authorities and the supervisory authorities under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 to deal with infringements of this Directive related to personal data.

    Relevant articles:35
  • 137

    This Directive should aim to ensure a high level of responsibility for the cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations at the level of the essential and important entities. Therefore, the management bodies of the essential and important entities should approve the cybersecurity risk-management measures and oversee their implementation.

  • 138

    In order to ensure a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union on the basis of this Directive, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of supplementing this Directive by specifying which categories of essential and important entities are to be required to use certain certified ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes or obtain a certificate under a European cybersecurity certification scheme. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making . In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

    Relevant articles:2438
  • 139

    In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Directive, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to lay down the procedural arrangements necessary for the functioning of the Cooperation Group and the technical and methodological as well as sectoral requirements concerning the cybersecurity risk-management measures, and to further specify the type of information, the format and the procedure of incident, cyber threat and near miss notifications and of significant cyber threat communications, as well as cases in which an incident is to be considered to be significant. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council .

    Relevant articles:23
  • 140

    The Commission should periodically review this Directive, after consulting stakeholders, in particular with a view to determining whether it is appropriate to propose amendments in light of changes to societal, political, technological or market conditions. As part of those reviews, the Commission should assess the relevance of the size of the entities concerned, and the sectors, subsectors and types of entity referred to in the annexes to this Directive for the functioning of the economy and society in relation to cybersecurity. The Commission should assess, inter alia, whether providers, falling within the scope of this Directive, that are designated as very large online platforms within the meaning of Article 33 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council could be identified as essential entities under this Directive.

    Relevant articles:40
  • 141

    This Directive creates new tasks for ENISA, thereby enhancing its role, and could also result in ENISA being required to carry out its existing tasks under Regulation (EU) 2019/881 to a higher level than before. In order to ensure that ENISA has the necessary financial and human resources to carry out existing and new tasks, as well as to meet any higher level of execution of those tasks resulting from its enhanced role, its budget should be increased accordingly. In addition, in order to ensure the efficient use of resources, ENISA should be given greater flexibility in the way that it is able to allocate resources internally for the purpose of effectively carrying out its tasks and meeting expectations.

  • 142

    Since the objective of this Directive, namely to achieve a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of the effects of the action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

  • 143

    This Directive respects the fundamental rights, and observes the principles, recognised by the Charter, in particular the right to respect for private life and communications, the protection of personal data, the freedom to conduct a business, the right to property, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence and the rights of the defence. The right to an effective remedy extends to the recipients of services provided by essential and important entities. This Directive should be implemented in accordance with those rights and principles.

  • 144

    The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council and delivered an opinion on 11 March 2021 ,

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